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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the emergence of an international
regime which monitors and regulates the movement of money,
also known as an anti-money-laundering regime. The discus-
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sion reviews its evolution and implementation and the extent
to which nine governments have amended domestic laws and
signed or ratified international conventions, resolutions, and
agreements to comply with the international anti-money-laun-
dering regime. The Article then assesses whether current anti-
money-laundering initiatives have made a measurable or quali-
tative difference within the specific countries by reducing mon-
ey-laundering activity.
The laws and policies of nine countries in the following
three regions are reviewed: Caribbean-Latin America (the
Bahamas, Ecuador and Uruguay); Pacific-Asia (Australia, Ja-
pan, and Hong Kong); and Europe (the United Kingdom,
France, and Austria). The Article analyzes the effectiveness of
the various conventions and laws that comprise the anti-mon-
ey-laundering regime and focuses special attention on addition-
al measures that can be taken to counter money-laundering
activity.
II. AN EMERGING REGIME-INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN
LAWS
An international criminal cooperation regime establishes a
set of rules among governments and international organiza-
tions that requires cooperation in the investigation, prosecu-
tion and adjudication, and execution of judgments in criminal
matters.1 International cooperation on criminal matters is an
evolving regime which has recently given rise to a subregime
whose purpose is to regulate international money movement.2
International and foreign laws that regulate the movement of
money are a relatively recent phenomenon in international law
enforcement.' These laws, also known as anti-money-launder-
1. For a discussion of regimes in international criminal law, see Bruce
Zagaris & Constantine Papavizas, Using the Organization of American States to
Control International Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL (R.D. INT'L PENAL) 119, 128-32 (1986).
2. For a discussion of the emergence of a subregime on the regulation of
international money movement, see Bruce Zagaris & Markus Bornheim, Chapter
on Foreign and International Money Laundering Laws, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM.
JusT. 162, 189-201. This Article will refer to anti-money-laundering as a regime
and subregime, depending on its context.
3. This section is derived partly from Bruce Zagaris & Elizabeth Kingma,
Asset Forfeiture International and Foreign Law: An Emerging Regime, 5 EMoRY
INT'L L. REV. 446 (1991).
1993] 873
BROOK. J. INTL L.
ing laws, reflect a steadfast commitment by governments and
international organizations to combat illicit drug trafficking
and other forms of illegal criminal activity, especially as con-
ducted by organized crime. Laws are being ratified in several
countries in an effort to develop an international criminal
cooperation regime.
As the laundering of funds derived from crime increases,
the subregime of regulating international money movement is
gathering a momentum of its own and is expanding beyond
merely narcotics trafficking to encompass other forms of crimi-
nal activity.4 Asset forfeiture, which is intended to deprive the
criminal of the benefits of the crime, is a key element of many
anti-money-laundering laws. This section of the Article will
review the increase of initiatives that regulate international
money movement and discuss some of the difficulties inherent
in the development of such a regime, especially as it relates to
asset forfeiture.
Because anti-money-laundering laws are being developed
at such a rapid rate, inconsistencies in legislation occur and
present difficulties for international cooperation. Legal systems
differ in their organization, procedures, and substantive law.
Culture also plays a significant role.5 Not surprisingly, similar
legal systems afford enhanced opportunities for cooperation.
Governments following the common-law system, such as Cana-
da, the United States, and members of the British Common-
wealth, share a common legal base and have similar concepts
and institutions.6 Likewise, European countries adhering to
4. For additional discussion of international anti-money-laundering regulation
from a U.S. perspective, see Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International En-
forcement of Money Movement and Related Matters-A United States Perspective, 22
GEO. WASH. J. INTL L. & ECON. 465 (1989).
5. For instance, traditional civil law puts more emphasis on and confidence
in the validity and utility of formal definitions and distinctions. The division of
law in the civil-law tradition into public law, of which criminal law is a part, and
private law, of which real property and obligations are a part, is fundamental and
much greater than in common-law systems. These distinctions are sources of prob-
lems and misunderstandings. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
98-99 (1969).
6. The concept of common law is the concept of a growing and always chang-
ing system of legal principles and theories. However, the modern tendency toward
codification, which was a principle of the Roman and Civil Law, has eroded the
jurisdictions with a pure English Common Law, although, some jurists categorize
England as still having a pure English Common-Law System. Compare the dis-
cussion in RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 188-203 (3d ed. 1970)
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the Napoleonic Code follow related legal concepts and institu-
tions for resolving disputes connected with, inter alia, obliga-
tions,7 property law,' and administrative penal law.9 Govern-
ments from disparate legal systems, such as the Islamic legal
system and the common-law system, may have more difficul-
ties in understanding and bridging differences in concepts,
institutions, procedure, and substance. °
Bridging legal systems is extremely difficult because asset-
forfeiture laws and cases encompass divergent legal areas."
For instance, identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing, and requir-
ing the forfeiture of contraband are usually required to penal-
ize a person who has committed a crime-thus criminal law is
immediately implicated. However, countries such as the United
States have devised civil in rem proceedings for asset forfei-
ture, which give rise to a separate range of proceedings and
procedures. 2 With asset forfeiture, imprisonment and other
penal sanctions are not at issue. Therefore, the level of proce-
dural protection afforded property owners is not commensurate
with that in MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 268-83
(1985).
7. For a discussion of the law of obligations under the civil-law system, see
SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 448-63; see also F.H. LAWSON ET AL., AMOS AND
WALTON'S INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 137-48 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing obliga-
tions in general); id. at 149-99 (referring to contract and quasi-contracts).
8. For a discussion of property law in civil-law countries, see Max
Rheinstein, Some Fundamental Differences in Real Property Ideas of the "Civil
Law" and the Common Law Systems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 624 (1936).
9. For an excellent discussion of different treatment by different legal sys-
tems of administrative penal law, as well as a summary of the treatment of such
law in 27 countries, see Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Legal and Practical Problems
Posed by the Difference Between Criminal Law and Administrative Law, 59 R.D.
INT'L PENAL 15 (1988).
10. For an example of the importance of conceptual differences between West-
ern and non-Western legal traditions, see Salah-Eldin Abdel-Wahab, Meaning and
Structure of Law in Islam, 16 VAND. L. REv. 115 (1962); George M. Baroody,
Shari'a: Law of Islam: An American Lawyer in the Courts of Saudi Arabia, 17
ARAMCO WORLD 26 (1966). Compare these articles with the whole concept of the
Western legal tradition as discussed in GLENDON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14-39.
11. For a useful discussion on how to bridge the differences among legal sys-
tems and to unify and harmonize such systems, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at
28-30; see also Symposium, The International Unification of Law, 16 AM. J. COMP.
L. 1 (1968).
12. Examples of civil in rem statutes are the customs forfeiture laws. See, e.g.,
21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (Supp. 1993) (civil forfeiture pursuant to Controlled Substances
Act); 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(3) (1970) (transporting illegal aliens); 18 U.S.C. § 2513
(1970) (communication interception devices).
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with the level given to criminal defendants. Civil forfeiture
may occur without the benefit of a judicial proceeding. Once
seized, the government retains custody until title is deter-
mined, and the burden of proof is on the claimant to the prop-
erty. 3 One of the central difficulties in judicial assistance in
asset-forfeiture cases arises from the civil/criminal dichotomy.
For instance, requests by United States authorities to seize
assets have often been denied by countries which allow crimi-
nal forfeiture only, whereas the same seizure would be simply
effectuated in the United States through in rem procedures.
This type of divergence may be solved by international conven-
tions. 4 The Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation (European Laundering Convention) resolves this
problem by obligating requested states to cooperate "to the
widest extent possible for the purposes of investiga-
tion .... 5
Another barrier to effective judicial assistance in anti-
money-laundering prosecutions stems from the disparate defi-
nitions of money laundering and the predicate crimes. Further-
more, asset-forfeiture law extends beyond property rights to
contractual rights, 6 thereby involving applicable laws in this
field. Another complication is that forfeiture, which occurs
13. For a useful discussion of the procedural differences between U.S. civil
and criminal forfeiture, see Robert Luskin, Forfeiture Statutes: A Brief Survey and
History, in FORFEITURES AND ASSET FREEZES A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF ASSET
FORFEITURES, RESTRAINTS AND THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS, at Tab A (A.B.A. Inst. Crim.
Just. 2d ed., 1990) [hereinafter FORFEITURES]; Michael F. Zeldin & Roger G.
Weiner, Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Rights and Scope of Recovery of
Innocent Third Parties, in FORFEITURES, supra at Tab B; Michael Goldsmith &
Mark Jay Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Fur-
ther Law Reform, in FORFEITURES, supra at Tab P.
14. See, e.g., Draft Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation from the Proceeds of Crime, Council of Europe
Doc. ACDPC17ADD11.90, Restricted CDPC (80) 17 Addendum 11, at T 15 (July 6,
1990) [hereinafter Draft Explanatory Report] (explaining that the convention ap-
plies to diverse decisions to confiscate, including decisions by criminal courts, ad-
ministrative courts, separate judicial authorities, in civil or criminal proceedings
totally separate from those in which the guilt of the offender is determined).
15. Convention of Laundering, Searches, Seizure and Confiscation, Nov. 8,
1990, art 7.1, 30 I.L.M. 148, 150 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1993) [hereinafter
European Laundering Convention]; see generally infra part II.D.2.; see also
SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 28-30.
16. For instance, the European Laundering Convention defines "proceeds" that
can be the object of confiscation to include "any economic advantage from criminal
offenses." See European Laundering Convention, supra note 15, art. 1(a).
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outside of the criminal justice system, may involve either civil
or administrative procedure. 7
As intergovernmental organizations continue to strive for
conventions and/or uniform legislation on anti-money-launder-
ing, many of the gaps and obstacles that arise from conflicts of
laws will be resolved. 8 The first part of this Article outlines
the principal efforts of the various international organizations
to resolve conflicts and gaps, and the means by which some of
the issues are likely to be resolved.
In the normal course of creating anti-money-laundering
legislation, the tendency is to agree initially on narrow sets of
legal principles and policies and then to broaden them. For
instance, one of the initial intergovernmental agreements on
anti-money-laundering, the Vienna Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna
UN Drug Convention), was limited in many ways because it
was an initial effort and because the participating govern-
ments were so diverse. Nevertheless, subsequent efforts draw
from the Vienna UN Drug Convention and utilize wherever
possible the same terminology and systematic approach of that
convention, unless changes are believed necessary for improve-
ment.' 9
Cooperation has increased substantially among regional
groups that share similar institutions and legal systems and
17. The interaction of administrative, civil, and criminal law is especially diffi-
cult in non-common-law legal systems in which there is a much greater distinction
between public and private law. For example, see the discussion of the historical
background of the differences between private and public law in SCHLESINGER,
supra note 6, at 243-44. See also John H. Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law
Distinction in European and United States Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3 (1968).
18. For example, modern day comparative law approaches, in discussing
bridging legal gaps, omit discussion of the role of intergovernmental organizations
and indeed even international organizational theory. In other words, comparative
law is taught independently from international law and international politics, so
that the role of intergovernmental organizations in comparative law is not consid-
ered. The discussion in this article blends the two disciplines since the contem-
porary reality of international asset-forfeiture law inextricably involves comparative
and international law with international politics.
19. See European Laundering Convention, supra note 15. See also SUMMARY
DRAFT EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON LAUNDERING, SEARCH, SEI-
ZURE AND CONFISCATION OF THE PROCEEDS ON CRIME, Council of Europe Doc.
ACDPC17ADDII.90, Restricted CDPC (90) 17 Addendum II, ' 4 (Nov. 8, 1990)
[hereinafter SUMMARY DRAFT REPORT] (explaining how the European Laundering.
Convention emulated the Vienna UN Drug Convention). See also Model Regula-
tions, infra note 138.
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that interact within a common criminal justice organization. 0
The most extensive cooperation has occurred between members
of the Council of Europe, the majority of whose governments
have similar legal systems based on the Napoleonic Code. One
organ of the Council of Europe which is of paramount impor-
tance is the Committee on Crime Problems. This institution
has convened policy makers in criminal justice for more than
thirty years.2' The Committee on Crime Problems promotes
close cooperation on a variety of criminal justice and judicial
assistance issues. It affords the Council of Europe's member
governments continual opportunities to discuss and plan effec-
tive cooperation in a way that most countries cannot.
One key issue that will complicate international judicial
assistance and cooperation in money-laundering prosecutions
and asset forfeiture is the interaction between international
criminal law and international human rights law.22 Interna-
tional conventions cannot readily resolve the conflicts which
arise in this rubric because at issue are fundamental values, as
well as different ways of protecting rights under the two
branches of the law. An appropriate way to view this is as
the need to strike a proper balance between asset seizure for
suspects of crimes on the one hand, and notice and opportunity
to be heard and basic human rights on the other. This Article
will review some of the arguments that are likely to arise in
the interaction of criminal law and human rights.
20. SUMMARY DRAFT REPORT, supra note 19.
21. For background on the Council of Europe, the Committee on European
Crime Problems, the number of criminal cooperation agreements, and their role in
the preparation of the European Laundering Convention, see Hans G. Nilsson,
Money Laundering-The European Situation, in FORFEITURES, supra note 13; for the
agreements themselves, see EKKEHARD MOLLER-RAPPARD & M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
EUROPEAN INTER-STATE COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (1987).
22. For background on the consistencies and tensions between the fields of
international criminal law and international human rights law, see Anthony
D'Amato, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in NEW HORIZONS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 45-47 (1985); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Criminal Law and Human Rights, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 15,
15-32 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
23. Appropriate limits on international criminal law and the best utilization of
international criminal law to prevent the violation of human rights remains to be
ascertained. Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 31.
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A The Influences
The new conventions, laws, and resolutions of internation-
al organizations regulating international money movement
reflects the convergence of efforts by governments and interna-
tional organizations. The most significant work has been un-
dertaken by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and has
culminated in international conventions. These conventions, for
example, the Vienna UN Drug Convention, impose binding
obligations on signatory countries. Binding obligations are
referred to as "hard law." Some resolutions and reports recom-
mending specific actions are not binding on countries or per-
sons and therefore are referred to as "soft law."24
Both hard and soft laws comprise the international anti-
money-laundering regime. Although soft laws.are not immedi-
ately binding, they are usually precursors to hard law. For
instance, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD)
and the G-7 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have promul-
gated recommendations to combat money laundering. 25 In an
era of multinational actors and concerns, use of co-optive or
soft power is often preferable to traditional hard power means.
Soft power is evident when one nation persuades another to
want what it wants and tends to arise from the rules and insti-
tutions of international regimes.26 These constitute only soft
law which will very likely become hard law. The FATF's as-
sessments and external policy reviews have encouraged gov-
ernments to ratify laws and amend policies to meet the anti-
money-laundering standards of the FATF recommendations.
In addition, CICAD's anti-money-laundering regulations have
been enacted into law by Colombia and Ecuador and will possi-
bly become the basis for a convention modeled on the Council
of Europe Laundering Convention.
24. "Hard law is enforceable in a court. . . [whereas] [s]oft law is not judi-
cially enforceable but simply constitutes moral standards and guidelines." Michael
0. Small, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The Alien
Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 172 n.67 (1985). An
example of soft law is international environmental law. See Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2400 (1991).
25. See infra notes 66-85 & 135-57 and accompanying text.
26. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Policy, 80 FOREIGN POLy 153, 168 (1990) (on the
inability of the major nations to control their environments without cooperation
from smaller states).
27. See, e.g., infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
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B. International Politics
An examination of cooperation between intergovernmental
organizations is vital because the major actor and traditional
source of power in the international arena-the territorial
state-is being eclipsed by nonterritorial actors, such as IGOs,
transnational social movements, and multinational corpora-
tions. In some countries, the authority of the territorial state is
being supplanted by organized crime, including narco-terror-
ists.2" The shrinking world has assisted narco-traffickers
while nation-states try to cooperate more through forming new
international organizations and treaties to combat money laun-
dering. This underscores the notion that the politics of global
interdependence is inescapable.29
Concomitant with the rise of global interdependence, crim-
inal law enforcement policy has become a priority on nations'
foreign policy agendas, especially as it applies to international
business and national security. G-7 summit declarations
strongly indicate that criminal policy and cooperation have
expanded in scope from economics to terrorism, drugs, and
more recently money laundering.' °
Traditional instruments of power cannot deal with these
new underworld threats to international political stability.
Various international groups will interact and cooperate in an
effort to mitigate the threats of organized criminal groups."'
As resources and events that shape international power
change, so also must the approach governments take to acquire
and manipulate international power. Countries, such as the
28. For a useful discussion of the international politics of narco-terrorism, see
Peter A. Lupsha, The Role of Drugs and Drug Trafficking in the Invisible Wars, in
INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING 15 (Dennis Rowe' ed., 1988); for a discussion of
the international politics of narcotics control, see RuFus KING, THE DRUG HANG-
UP: AMERICA'S FIFrY-YEAR FOLLY 208-28 (1972); DRUGS, POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY:
THE INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION 24-28 (Luiz R.S. Simmons & Abdul A. Said eds.,
1974).
29. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDEPEN-
DENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 3-4 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Report, infra
note 66, at 24. See also Nye, supra note 26, at 164; Carlos A. Perez, OAS Oppor-
tunities, 80 FOREIGN POLY 52, 55 (1990) (on the need for a collective approach to
solving regional problems); Theodore C. Sorenson, Rethinking National Security, 69
FOREIGN AFF. 1, 3 (1990) (discussing global interdependence and its implications
for national defense).
31. See Nye, supra note 26, at 164.
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United States, which have had substantial influence from a
hard power perspective must be careful to hone soft power,
which is less expensive and, therefore, becoming more attrac-
tive with the same vigor that they have given to developing
hard power in the past."
C. International Regimes-A Framework for Cooperation
The purpose of international regimes is to regulate* and
control certain transnational relations and activities.33 They
have been defined as "norms, rules, and procedures agreed to
in order to regulate an issue-area."34 Members of internation-
al regimes obtain benefits through explicit or tacit cooperation
based on common concerns, such as reducing the supply and
demand of illicit narcotics, reducing the power of organized
criminal groups, and combatting money laundering. Since a
regime emphasizes achievement of several specific objectives,
international regimes are considered to be more likely to un-
dergo evolutionary changes than IGOsY
A successful regime "reduces the cost of legitimate transac-
tions while increasing the costs of illegitimate ones"36 (i.e.,
money laundering and drug trafficking). Today's dynamic glob-
al marketplace and world order present new problems for in-
ternational regimes. To combat money laundering effectively,
international regimes must be flexible, stable, able to make
32. Nye, supra note 26, at 168.
33. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 29, at 5.
34. Ernst B. Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes,
32 WORLD POL. 357, 358 (1980). Another definition is found in Jock A. Finlayson
& Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dy-
namics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273, 273 (Steven D. Krasner
ed., 1983) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL REGIMES]. International regime is a special-
ized term that originated when international organization theory was developed in
the early 1970s. See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Transnational Rela-
tions and World Politics, in 25 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 325 (1979). The term
describes a series of activities that involve mostly governmental actors, but also
affect the international trade conducted by nongovernmental actors. See Finlayson
& Zacher, supra at 275. International regimes have also affected policy-making
about oceans. See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 29, at 63-164.
35. WERNER J. FELD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 37 (2d ed. 1988).
36. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 107 (1984); see also Robert 0. Keohane, The
Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 34, at
141-71.
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decisions, expend resources, enact laws, provide judicial assis-
tance, and otherwise cooperate in transnational criminal mat-
ters.
D. Intergovernmental Organizations
The following section on IGOs outlines the roles these
organizations play in anti-money-laundering initiatives as they
emerge and evolve in the world. The operations of IGOs are
discussed, including some of the organizations' attempts both
to develop certain components of the anti-money-laundering
regime and to link these components with other organizations
and territorial actors. This Article includes a discussion of
some of the interactions and dynamics between IGOs These
and other elements of analysis are required to discuss regime
transformation fully. Analysis of regime transformation is
critical in order to speculate about the future of the regime of
regulating international money movement and the subregime
of asset forfeiture.8
1. Global Organizations
a. The United Nations
The United Nations has played an important role in urg-
ing the world to suppress illicit drug trafficking. 9 On Decem-
ber 20, 1988, the United Nations Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna
UN Drug Convention) was signed by forty-three countries.40
37. For a discussion of the institutional and bureaucratic aspects of IGOs and
international regimes, see FELD ET AL., supra note 35, at 81-120. For a discussion
of decision-making processes and policy-making scope of IGOs and international
regimes, see FELD ET AL., supra note 35, at 121-67.
38. For discussions of regime transformation, see FELD ET AL. supra note 35,
at 247-48; ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER
74-100 (1989); Oran R. Young, Regime Dynamics and the Rise and Fall of Inter-
national Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 34, at 93, 106-12.
39. It has fostered the UN International Drug Program, as well as the UN
Drug Commission and the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice. See, e.g., U.N. DIVISION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, DECLARATION OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND COMPREHEN-
SIVE MULTIDISCIPLINARY OUTLINE OF FUTURE ACTIVITIES IN DRUG ABUSE CONTROL
at 51-72, U.N. Doc. ST/NAR/14, U.N. Sales No. 88.XI.1 (1988).
40. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/ConfJ8215 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493
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That convention, which took effect on November 1, 1990, is a
law enforcement treaty and contains provisions requiring inter-
national criminal cooperation including extradition,4' confis-
cation,42 and mutual legal assistance and cooperation between
law enforcement agencies.4" The Vienna UN Drug Convention
also establishes money laundering as an offense and makes the
aiding and abetting of it an offense. In particular, article 3
provides that the following conduct constitutes criminal activi-
ty:
(b)(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing
that such property is derived from any offense or
offenses established in accordance with subpara-
graph (a) of this paragraph, or from an act of partic-
ipation in such offense or offenses, for the purpose
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the
property or of assisting any person who is involved
in the commission of such an offense or offenses to
evade the legal consequences of his actions;
(b)(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature,
source, location, disposition, movement, rights with
respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that
such property is derived from an offense or offenses
established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of
this paragraph or from an act of participation in
such an offense or offenses. 4
The Vienna UN Drug Convention requires that mutual legal
assistance be rendered for any of the crimes enumerated there-
in, including money laundering, and states that a requested
country cannot refuse to render mutual legal assistance on the
basis of bank secrecy.45
In preparing and negotiating the Vienna UN Drug Con-
vention, close bonds developed among the negotiators as they
(1989) [hereinafter Vienna UN Drug Convention]. For a discussion of money laun-
dering and other offenses in the convention, see Bruce Zagaris, Developments in
International Judicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 339, 342-48 (1990).
41. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 6.
42. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 5.
43. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 7.
44. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 3.
45. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 7.5.
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developed common definitions and concepts. These negotiators
agreed to extend and refine the asset-forfeiture obligations in
other fora, such as those established by the Council of Eu-
rope.46
Another UN organization that has been instrumental in
molding anti-money-laundering legislation is the UN Commis-
sion on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. At its eighth
general meeting on September 7, 1990, the UN Crime Con-
gress (known until 1991 as the UN Committee on Crime Pre-
vention Control) adopted a number of model treaties on inter-
national criminal cooperation.47 One of the treaties adopted
defines assistance and cooperation in asset forfeiture,48 while
another provides for mutual assistance in common extraditable
offenses and provides simplified procedures for extradition.49
The latter treaty contains an optional provision that would
obligate requested states to determine whether proceeds of
alleged crimes are located within their jurisdiction by tracing
assets, investigating financial dealings, and obtaining other
evidence that might assist in securing the recovery of the pro-
ceeds of crime.5" The requested state would, to the extent al-
lowed by its law, give effect to or allow enforcement of the final
order of forfeiture or confiscation of the proceeds. 51
b. INTERPOL
INTERPOL, the International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion, has been in the forefront of promoting cooperation and
assistance between states in the investigation of money laun-
dering. Most significantly, INTERPOL provides technical assis-
tance and training on methods for combatting money launder-
ing-especially in the Caribbean and Latin America.
INTERPOL's Caribbean and Latin American working
groups have successfully developed model legislation on money
46. See infra part II.D.2.
47. See Bruce Zagaris, 8th U.N. Crime Congress Adopts Model Treaties on
Extradition, Mutual Assistance, Transfer of Proceedings and Supervision, and Cul-
tural Heritage, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 369 (1990) [hereinafter Zagaris, U.N.
Crime Congress].
48. Id. at 372.
49. Id. at 371-72.
50. Id. at 372.
51. Id. at 372. For additional background, see United Nations Press Release
UNIS, CP/174 11 September 1990.
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laundering. The General Assembly of INTERPOL subsequently
adopted model legislation which provides for the temporary
freezing of property prior to the filing of criminal charges.5 2
Additionally, the legislation authorizes "the issuance of re-
straining orders, injunctions, and other actions regarding prop-
erty" which is deemed to be derived from criminal activity.53
It also provides for the forfeiture of such property to the gov-
ernment of the country where it is located upon conviction of
the owner for possession of criminal proceeds.5 4 INTERPOL's
Fonds Provenant d'Activitds Criminelles (FOPAC) working
group continues to review asset forfeiture and other economic
crime issues, particularly as they relate to drug trafficking.5
INTERPOL's resolutions to combat international money
laundering and implement provisions to forfeit crime proceeds
illustrate its continuing leadership in forging a consensus
among its members to cooperate against money laundering.5"
INTERPOL recognizes the advantages of closer cooperation
with international organizations. After INTERPOL adopted
the model legislation on money laundering and forfeiture of
assets during its General Assembly in August 1985, it em-
barked on an extraordinary lobbying campaign to enact the
52. See Bruce Zagaris, INTERPOL Adopts Model Legislation on Forfeiting
Crime Proceeds, 2 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 65, 67 (1986) [hereinafter Zagaris,
INTERPOL].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The Fonds Provenant d'Activitds Criminelles (FOPAC) was established in
1983 to investigate the financial assets of organized crime. Its responsibilities
include: systematically gathering financial information, studying financial informa-
tion to obtain information on organized crime, publishing this information to other
organizations combatting organized crime, training individuals in investigative
techniques, and furthering cooperation among international organizations that com-
bat organized crime.
56. INTERPOL was one of the first IGOs actively to adopt measures to com-
bat internationally the problem of funds derived from criminal activities, starting
with the 1985 Caribbean Resolution. However, the fact that INTERPOL has, like
other police organizations, not cultivated public relations and has shunned publici-
ty and political intervention has limited its political influence beyond police organi-
zations. On the latter problem, see Bruce Zagaris, INTERPOL Secretary General
Highlights Action on Money Laundering and Terrorism, 2 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
REP. 135, 137 (1986); MICHAEL FOONER, INTERPOL ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26-27 (1989).
57. For a discussion of IGO interactions with other IGOs and the absence of
systematic exploration of such interactions, see FELD ET AL., supra note 35, at
188-89.
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-model legislation outside the INTERPOL community.5" For
example, in September 1985, the model was presented to the
Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) during a meeting in Brus-
sels, and the CCC said it planned to distribute it to the Com-
missioners of Customs in its member countries.59 To promote-
anti-money-laundering legislation further, the Secretary Gen-
eral of INTERPOL, Mr. Ray Kendall, has written to the Minis-
ters of Justice and Attorneys General of non-INTERPOL coun-
tries to notify them of the model legislation. In February 1986,
Mr. Kendall also presented the model legislation to the UN
* Fund for Drug Abuse Control.6° INTERPOL has broadened its
membership to include former members, Poland and the for-
mer Czechoslovakia, and new member, the then Soviet Union,
thereby increasing its influence and budget for the regulation
of money movement.6 INTERPOL's active role in shaping the
regime of anti-money-laundering illustrates the key role of
IGOs in regime transformation.
c. The G-7 Group and the Financial Action Task Force
New enforcement initiatives have also been adopted dur-
ing meetings between leaders of the seven leading industrial-
ized democracies, the G-7.62 From the beginning, one of their
priorities has been to eliminate the money-laundering opera-
tions used by drug kingpins to move billions of dollars through
the international banking system.
On July 16, 1989, the G-7 issued a communiqu6 which
pledged to enhance international criminal cooperation on four
key topics: drugs, money laundering, terrorism, and the envi-
58. FELD ET AL., supra note 35; see also UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS AND DRUG ABUSE CONTROL 85-89 (1987) (describing the role and accomplish-
ments of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)).
59. See Zagaris, INTERPOL, supra note 52, at 67.
60. For a discussion of the effort by INTERPOL to lobby for the enactment of
the model legislation, see Zagaris, INTERPOL, supra note 52, at 135-36.
61. For a discussion of the entry of the members of the former socialist bloc
and other recent developments relating to drug-related matters, see 59th General
Assembly Meeting of INTERPOL Member Countries, 6 INTL ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
411, 411-13 (1990).
62. The G-7 Summit is an annual meeting of the heads of government of the
leading seven industrial nations (the United States, Italy, France, the United
Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and Germany). The agenda is predominantly economic.
Traditionally, a statement is released at the end of the summit containing any
agreements on policies reached.
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ronment.63 Most important, the communiqu6 announced the
establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
formed from summit participants and other interested coun-
tries to deal with money laundering.6' The G-7 has been
joined by the governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzer-
land. The task force is politically significant because it is a
step towards "the institutionalization of international coopera-
tion ... 65
On April 23, 1990, the FATF issued a report containing
recommendations for combatting money laundering.66 These
recommendations have important implications for the conduct
of employees of international businesses and financial institu-
tions, and a significant impact on the investigation and prose-
cution of persons accused of money laundering.
The report recommends the following measures to combat
money laundering: improving the national legal systems, en-
hancing the role of the financial system in reporting and moni-
toring suspicious activity, and strengthening international
cooperation. According to the report, the FATF members
unanimously agreed that financial institutions' secrecy policies
should not inhibit the implementation of the report's recom-
mendations.68
The report further states that each country should
criminalize drug money laundering as required by the Vienna
UN Drug Convention 69 and that member governments should
consider "extending the offense of drug money laundering to
any other crimes" for which a link to narcotics exists.7' Alter-
63. See Bruce Zagaris, G-7 Countries Agree to Take Action on Drugs Launder-
ing and Terrorism, 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 255 (1989).
64. Id. at 256.
65. Id.
66. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, OECD Doc. Feb. 7,
1990 [hereinafter FATF Report 1]; see also Bruce Zagaris, Financial Action Task
Force Releases Report to Combat Money Laundering, 6 INTL ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
183 (1990). The report is a combined effort of three working groups: money laun-
dering statistics and methods chaired by the United Kingdom, legal questions
chaired by the United States, and administrative and financial cooperation chaired
by Italy. FATF Report 1, supra.
67. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 3.
68. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 2.
69. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 4.
70. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 5. The United Kingdom
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natively, the report recommends extending the offense of mon-
ey laundering to all "criminal offenses that generate significant
proceeds, or on certain serious offenses."7'
Pursuant to the Vienna UN Drug Convention, the FATF
Report calls for measures that will enable the competent au-
thorities to "confiscate property laundered, proceeds from and
instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the conimis-
sion of any money-laundering offense, or property of corre-
sponding value." 2 In addition, measures should be adopted
authorizing governments to: "(1) identify, trace, and evaluate
property which is subject to confiscation; (2) carry out provi-
sional measures, such as freezing and seizing, to prevent any
dealing, transfer, or disposal of such property[;] and (3) take
any appropriate investigative measures."73 The report directs
countries to consider imposing monetary and civil penalties or
proceedings to void contracts where the parties knew or should
have known that the contract's result would prejudice the
state's ability to recover financial claims.74
The FATF recommendations also encourage improving the
role of the financial system in combatting money laundering,
(i.e., banks and non-bank financial institutions).75 The report
suggests creating rules requiring these institutions to identify
customers and keep certain financial records.76 Financial in-
adopted this approach when it enacted the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986
(DTOA), ch. 32 (Eng.). Other Commonwealth governments such as Hong Kong
have emulated the United Kingdom. See, e.g., The Drug Trafficking (Recovery of
Proceeds) Ordinance, 1989, §§ 25.6-25.7.
71. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 5. The United States and
Australian laws take the latter approach and criminalize laundering the proceeds
of serious offenses.
72. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 8.
73. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 8.
74. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 8.
75. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 9. An important recom-
mendation which has been adopted establishes a working group to further examine
the possibility of creating "a common minimal list of non-bank financial institu-
tions and other professions dealing with cash subject to these recommendations."
See FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 11.
76. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 12. The report also pro-
rides that "[flinancial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all nec-
essary records on transactions, both domestic or international to enable them to
comply swiftly with information requests from competent authorities." FATF Report
1, supra note 66, Recommendation 14. It would require them to also keep records
on customer identification, account files, and business correspondence for at least
five years after an account is closed. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommenda-
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stitutions suspecting that funds were derived from criminal
activity should be allowed or required to report their suspicions
promptly to the competent authorities." Additionally, the re-
port mentions discussion of a currency transaction reporting
system, such as that implemented by the United States and
Australia.78
The report urges that competent international authorities
(perhaps INTERPOL and the CCC) be responsible for gather-
ing and disseminating information to government authorities
about money laundering and money-laundering techniques,
and that central banks and bank regulators should do the
same in their networks.79 It further provides that each gov-
ernment should furnish spontaneously or "upon request" infor-
mation relating to suspicious transactions and the persons and
corporations involved in those transactions.8 " Strict safe-
guards should be implemented to ensure that exchanges of
information are consistent with national and international
laws on privacy and data protection.8 '
Regarding cooperation between legal authorities, the re-
port is vague. Countries are encouraged to enter into "bilateral
and multilateral agreements based on generally shared legal
concepts... [to] affect the widest possible range of mutual
tion 14.
77. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 16. This recommendation
complies with the Basle Statement of Principles. See infra part II.D.l.e. However,
differing opinions existed within the FATF on whether the reporting of suspicious
activity should be mandatory or permissive. A few countries strongly believe that
reports should be mandatory-possibly restricted to suspicions of serious criminal
activities-and combined with administrative sanctions for failure to report. FATF
Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 16.
78. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 23. Specifically, the report
recommends the study of 'the feasibility of measures to detect or monitor cash at
the border ... subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of information"
and the freedom of legitimate capital movements. FATF Report 1, supra note 66,
Recommendation 23. Opposition to the implementation of a currency transaction
reporting system is mentioned in the report as well. FATF Report 1, supra note
66, Recommendation 23.
79. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 31. In addition, it is rec-
ommended that national administrations should consider recording, at least in the
aggregate, international flows of currency, "so that estimates can be made of cash
flows and reflows from various sources abroad." Such information would be made
available to the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for the International
Settlements. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 31.
80. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 32.
81. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 32.
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assistance."8 2 According to the report, countries should imple-
ment compulsory measures for mutual assistance in criminal
matters including authorizing expeditious action in response to
foreign requests to "identify, freeze, seize and confiscate pro-
ceeds or other property" connected to money laundering and
related crimes.8 The report encourages creating procedures to
avoid conflicts in prosecuting defendants in more than one
country and to coordinate seizure and confiscation proceedings
which may involve the same confiscated assets.84 Govern-
ments are also urged to establish procedures to extradite indi-
viduals charged with a money-laundering offense or related
offenses.85
On June 22, 1992, the FATF approved its third report.8 6
A key accomplishment of the FATF during 1992 was to estab-
lish a means of monitoring the progress of its members in
implementing anti-money-laundering measures. A small team
of experts drawn from other FATF member countries conducts
the process and their findings are reviewed by the specialized
FATF working groups. The 1993 report described in-depth
examinations of eight member countries: Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the
United States." FATF members are also evaluated based on
an annual questionnaire regarding their progress in imple-
menting the forty anti-money-laundering recommendations
prepared'by the FATF in 1990.' With respect to the recom-
mendations, the FATF decided not to introduce additional
recommendations, but rather to prepare a number of interpre-
tative notes for use in conjunction with the existing recommen-
dations. The FATF has also begun studying possible preventive
measures to detect and deter the use of international wire
transfers of funds as a means of money laundering.
82. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendations 33 and 34.
83. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendations 37 and 38.
84. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 39.
85. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 40. The report states that
countries may consider simplifying extradition through various suggested proce-
dures. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 40.
86. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Report (Paris, June
1992) [hereinafter FATF Report 31 (on file with authors).
87. See Annual FATF Report Puts Eight Countries Under Microscope, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Aug. 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File.
88. FATF Report 3, supra note 86, at 3, 7.
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FATF policy has been directed toward encouraging world-
wide action against money laundering. During 1992 and 1993,
FATF members participated in a number of regional meetings
to discuss money laundering, including the Caribbean Finan-
cial Action Task Force in Kingston, Jamaica, the South East
Asia Central Bank Board of Governors in Jakarta, Indonesia,
the Asia Money-laundering Symposium in Singapore, and a
laundering conference in Warsaw, Poland. Discussions also
occurred with various Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. In addition, the FATF began developing connections with
the UN International Drugs Control Programme and the Coun-
cil of Europe. Future goals include: the expansion of the mutu-
al evaluation program with a large number of country exami-
nations each year, development of means to counter more so-
phisticated money-laundering techniques, and implementation
of the recommendations to promote a worldwide mobilization
against money laundering.
The FATF has developed a three-stage program for im-
proving relations with nonmember countries. The key objective
of the program is to introduce the issue of money laundering
through "direct contracts with financial centers ....",9 Collec-
tive commitment and peer pressure will provide the impetus
for the development of regional initiatives.9" Finally, bilateral
initiatives between individual FATF member governments and
particular non-member countries will address problems as they
are identified.9'
Several IGOs, such as the European Community (EC) and
the Council of Europe, have adopted the FATF's recommen-
dations. The Caribbean FATF is considering adopting the rec-
ommendations. This illustrates the efficacy of the "soft law" of
influential organizations.
Similar concepts and principles are reflected in the Vienna
UN Drug Convention, the FATF Recommendations, and the
European Laundering Convention. This development of related
concepts concerning the movement of money has occurred in a
period of less than two years (a significant accomplishment for
89. FATF Report 3, supra note 86, at 3-4.
90. FATF members have been encouraging the implementation of the 1990
FATF Report by those dependent, associate or otherwise connected territories with
which they have constitutional, historical, or geographical links.
91. FATF Report 3, supra note 86, at 3-4.
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each of the IGOs) and signifies regime transformation, in the
parlance of international organization theory. Significantly, the
G-7 summit-a relatively new and informal IGO-has become
a major player in the formation and transformation of the anti-
money-laundering regime.
d. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) has played an important role in developing
guidelines to minimize the overlap of jurisdiction and enforce-
ment laws that inhibit international investment and business
transactions. Most of its recommendations are of a general
nature and are not binding. Most legislatures and courts do
not heed them.
e. The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices
In December 1988 the Basle Committee on Banking Regu-
lations and Supervisory Practices (Basle Committee), adopted
a statement of principles entitled Prevention of Criminal Use of
the Banking System, Draft Code of Conduct (the Principles).92
The statement encourages banks to know their customers, spot
suspicious transactions, and to cooperate fully with law en-
forcement authorities. In particular, it states that where banks
have good reason to suppose that money held on deposit was
derived from criminal activity or that transactions made are
themselves criminal in purpose, appropriate measures should
be taken. For example, banks should deny assistance, sever
relations with the customer, and close or freeze accounts con-
nected with suspicious activity. It also recommends specific
means to implement these measures.
92. The committee is comprised of representatives of the central banks and
supervisory authorities of Group of Ten countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States, and Luxembourg). In December 1986, the Basle Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices (Basle Committee) requested U.S. representa-
tives from the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Comptroller of the Currency to draft a general statement of principles that
international bank supervisory authorities could encourage banks to follow. Pre-
vention of Criminal Use of the Banking System, Draft Code of Conduct, Basle
Committee Doc. BS/88/52 (1988) [hereinafter Principles].
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A number of regional supervisory authorities in the Carib-
bean, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa were
established because of the Basle Committee's work and due to
its influence.93 In the future, international cooperation among
bank supervisors is expected to extend to related forms of
financial intermediation, such as the writing of insurance and
the enforcement of securities and commodities regulations.94
The Basle Committee is also working closely with international
organizations to become more effective in implementing the
Principles.95 Although the Basle Committee's work on anti-
money-laundering is not as comprehensive as that of the G-7
Summit's FATF, its constituency-international bank-
ers-makes its contributions important.
On July 6, 1992, the Basle Committee issued new mini-
mum standards which apply when governments regulate inter-
national banks.96 Four principal elements are contained in
the minimum standards: 1) Any international banking group
should be supervised on a "consolidated basis" by a single
home country authority, taking account of its operations any-
where in the world;97 2) If a bank wants to establish branches
in a jurisdiction outside its home country, it will need the con-
sent of both its home country regulator and the regulator in
the country playing "host" to the new branches; 8 3) A home
country supervisor should have the right to receive information
on the international operations of banks under its supervision,
which will require an understanding on the gathering and
sharing of information between the home country and host
country supervisors;99 and 4) If a country is unhappy about
93. For a discussion of the encouragement of the establishment of regional
groups of supervisory authorities, see Peter Hayward, Prospects for Cooperation by
Bank Supervisors, 24 INT'L L. 787, 792 (1990). See also Report on International
Developments in Banking Supervision, Basle Committee Doc. No. 6, PART IX
(Sept. 1988).
94. For a discussion of growing cooperation between the Basle Committee and
other supervisory groups involved in financial intermediation, see Hayward, supra
note 93, at 797-800.
95. See Principles, supra note 92.
96. BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS BORDER
ESTABLISHMENTS (1992).
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 5.
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the international supervision of a bank whose domicile is else-
where, it can impose "restrictive measures" on branches of that
bank in its territory. °00
The last measure, if invoked, would mean that a bank
regulator who is not satisfied with the adequacy of supervision
of a bank whose domicile is elsewhere can take steps to im-
prove supervision, ranging from prohibiting branches from
doing business within its jurisdictions to setting a deadline for
the bank and its home country regulator to design or imple-
ment acceptable standards of supervision.
The standards are only a voluntary code of practice. In an
effort to promote them beyond the twelve members of the
Basle Committee, Gene Corrigan, past chairman of the Basle
Committee and past president of the Federal Reserve Bank,
sent copies to authorities in more than one hundred countries
to receive their approval of the standards at the annual meet-
ing of the International Monetary Fund in France in October
1992. However, Mr. Corrigan has admitted "that it would be a
considerable time before all bank regulators had sufficient
resources or expertise to monitor an international banking
group effectively."' 0 'The new and improved regulatory standards should make
bank fraud or deception more difficult and thereby prevent
cases similar to that of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International. It is expected that many countries, including
some with relatively strong supervisory systems such as the
United States, might have to change their laws to adopt the
standards. °2
2. Regional Organizations
a. The Council of Europe
The EC Money-laundering Directive was the result of a
three-year effort on the part of the Council of Europe. On the
100. Id. at 6. For additional background on the adoption of new minimum
supervisory bank standards, see Robert Peston, Basle Code to Avoid Repeat of
BCCI Case, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1992, at 3.
101. Id.
102. For additional background on the impact of the Basle Committee on coun-
tries, see Steven Prokesch, Regulators Agree on Rules to Prevent More B.C.C.L's,
N.Y. TiMES, July 7, 1992, at D1.
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first day that the convention was opened for signature, Novem-
ber 8, 1990, twelve governments signed. 0 3 The fact that so
many countries signed immediately, and that four other coun-
tries announced their intentions to sign, signals a tremendous
success for anti-money-laundering laws and for international
anti-crime cooperation in general.
Some of the European Laundering Convention's provisions
are far-reaching and have the potential to revolutionize inter-
national cooperation and international money movement regu-
lation. In addition to the experts from sixteen Council of Eu-
rope countries, the drafters consisted of experts from Australia,
Canada, and the United States, as well as INTERPOL, the
United Nations, the International Association of Penal Law,
the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation, and the
International Society of Social Defense.0 4 Although the con-
vention is based on the Vienna UN Drug Convention, it allows
signatory countries to criminalize laundering for non-drug-
related offenses. 05 The European Laundering Convention al-
so contains important substantive provisions, such as allowing
the criminalization of negligent money laundering."'
The European Laundering Convention first gathered mo-
mentum at the 15th Conference of the European Ministers of
Justice in Oslo on June 17-19, 1986, when the penal aspects of
drug abuse and drug trafficking were discussed. Discussion
centered around the need to eradicate the drug market by
freezing and confiscating the proceeds from drug trafficking. As
a result, the ministers adopted Resolution No. 1 which recom-
mended that the European Committee on Crime Problems
(CDPC) examine "the formulation in the light inter alia of the
work of the United Nations, of international norms and stan-
103. European Laundering Convention, supra note 15; see also Bruce Zagaris,
Twelve Countries Sign European Laundering Convention, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
REP. 380 (1990). The governments which signed the convention were Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The governments which plan to sign
include France, Finland, Ireland and Switzerland. Id.
104. SUMmARY DRAFT REPORT, supra note 19, $ 4.
105. See SUMMARY DRAFT REPORT, supra note 19, 9 14. BuREAU OF INT'L NAR-
COTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICs CONTROL STRAT-
EGY REPORT (1991), IV(3)-(4) [hereinafter 1991 NARCOTICs REPORT].
106. European Laundering Convention, supra note 15, art. 6.3 ("Each Party
may . . . establish also as offences . . . where the offender ought to have assumed
the property was proceeds [from crime].").
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dards to guarantee effective international cooperation between
judicial (and where necessary police) authorities in the detec-
tion, freezing and forfeiture of the proceeds of illicit drug traf-
ficking."10 7 At its 36th plenary session in September 1987 the
CDPC proposed, and the Committee of Ministers authorized,
the creation of a Select Committee of Experts on international
cooperation as regards search, seizure and confiscation of pro-
ceeds from crime.' The work of this committee was expedit-
ed at the request of the Ministers during the conference of the
Pompidou Group in London in May 1989.109
The United States is deliberating whether to sign the
European Laundering Convention but is hesitant to do so be-
cause it would either have to enter reservations on some of the
aspects of the convention or enact additional domestic legisla-
tion."0 At least one interested agency, the United States De-
partment of Justice, is aware that legislative action is required
to expand the types of crimes committed abroad after which
forfeiture may be allowed."'
As countries outside the Council of Europe accede to the
convention, the potential role of the Council of Europe in influ-
encing the transformation of international anti-money-launder-
ing laws and policy widens. However, the lack of an institu-
tional framework, the failure of outside countries to become
involved until recently, and the failure of other countries to
participate limits the influence of the Council of Europe in
developing anti-money-laundering policy.
107. SUMMARY DRAFT REPORT, supra note 19, 9 1.
108. SUMMARY DRAFT REPORT, supra note 19, 9 2.
109. SUMMARY DRAFT REPORT, supra note 19, T 5.
110. In order for the United States to give assistance to requesting states in
non-drug-related cases, new domestic legislation will be needed. See Mary Troland,
Office of International Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, and Hans Nilsson,
Council of Europe, Addresses at the A.B.A. National Institute on Asset Forfeiture
(Dec. 3-4, 1990). For a summary of the remarks, see Bruce Zagaris, ABA. Na-
tional Institute Considers International and Foreign Law Aspects of Asset Forfei-
ture, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 435, 437-38 (1990) [hereinafter Zagaris, A.B.A.
National Institute].
111. For a review of some of the policy issues, see Zagaris, A.B.A. National
Institute, supra note 110, at 437-38.
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b. The European Community
On December 17, 1990, the EC Finance Ministers proposed
a framework directive for money laundering"1 which became
final on June 10, 1991, as the Council Directive on Prevention
of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering."' The directive called on EC countries to make
the laundering of the proceeds from drug trafficking a criminal
offense;" 4 members were to comply with the directive by
January 1, 1993. The directive applies to banks, all other fi-
nancial service institutions, casinos and currency exchange
houses. The directive further provides that EC banks and other
financial institutions are not to violate secrecy laws when
disclosing banking information in money-laundering cases. The
agreement contains the following points: 1) The definition of
money laundering will only apply to drug proceeds," 5 al-
though EC members will have the option of also applying it to
other areas" 6 such as terrorism and kidnapping, and the EC
will establish a working party to examine the possibility of
extending the directive to other criminal activities; 2) Each EC
member will prohibit money laundering, as defined in the
directive;".7 and 3) The EC Commission will explore the
possibility of associating the new democracies in Eastern Eu-
rope with the agreement so that similar measures criminaliz-
ing the laundering of proceeds from trafficking will apply in
those countries.
112. This framework directive was the "Proposal for a Council Directive on
Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering"
that was submitted by the EC Commission to the Council of Ministers (the Coun-
cil) and the European Parliament (EP) on March 23, 1990. See Commission Pro-
posal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering, COM (90) 106 final at 254; see also Banking: One
Step Forward, One Back for Money Laundering Proposal at Council, European
Report, No. 1635, at 11-1 (Dec. 5, 1990).
113. See Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the
Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77
[hereinafter EC Money Laundering Directive].
114. Id. at art. 2. For additional background, see Lucy Kellaway, E.C. to Make
Drug Money Laundering a Crime, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at 116.
115. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 31A.
116. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113, art. 15, provides that
Member States can adopt or retain in force stricter provisions in the field to pre-
vent money laundering.
117. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113, art. 2.
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Member states must ensure that credit and financial insti-
tutions identify their customers by means of supporting evi-
dence particularly when opening accounts or offering safe cus-
tody facilities." 8 When 15,000 European Currency Units
(ECUs) (equal to U.S. $20,400) or more is held by a financial
institution for an occasional customer, proof of identity must be
obtained." 9 Member states will be able to impose stricter
rules; however, the adverse economic impact of such action
may obviously act as a deterrent.
To facilitate investigation into money laundering, member
states must ensure that credit and financial institutions keep a
copy of requisite identification references for a period of at
least five years after the relationship with their customer has
ended and for five years after the end of transactions. 20
Member states must also ensure that credit and financial insti-
tutions establish internal control and communication proce-
dures and take appropriate measures so that their employees
are aware of the provisions of the directive. It also recommends
that employees participate in special training programs.' 2 '
Financial and credit institutions and their employees must
report suspicious transactions to the designated national au-
thorities and otherwise cooperate fully with authorities.'22
At present, only three of the twelve members of the
EC-Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom-have
enacted laws against money laundering.
The EC directive is not as stringent as United States anti-
money-laundering legislation, since the latter relies heavily on
routine collection of information by a host of professionals and
financial institutions, who must forward such information to
the United States Department of Treasury when transactions
pass a threshold of $10,000 (almost one-half the threshold in
the EC). However, the directive will pressure other countries to
enact legislation against money laundering. For instance, the
Caribbean caters to flight capital-money transferred there
when the home country is unstable-and it will be under new
pressures to enact anti-money-laundering legislation. If the
118. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113, art. 3(1).
119. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113, art. 3(2).
120. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113, art. 4.
121. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113, art. 11.
122. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113, art. 5.
[Vol. XIX:3
ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING POLICY
Caribbean countries take such action, they probably will do so
as a group rather than individually; otherwise, money launder-
ers will take advantage of the countries that do not have such
legislation.
The EC's participation in INTERPOL, the Vienna UN
Drug Convention, and the G-7 FATF Report, indicates that it
is playing an active role in regime transformation independent
from the role played by its member states." Developments
in the EC will influence regime transformation on internation-
al anti-crime cooperation, regulation of international money
movement, and asset forfeiture. For instance, the Convention
Applying the Schengen Agreement (Schengen Accord) signed
June 19, 1990 by five countries, Belgium, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 1"4
allows police from other countries to pursue criminal suspects
across their national borders.'25 Signatories to the Schengen
Accord will also establish a permanent working group on illicit
drug trafficking, 2 ' to supplement both the Vienna UN Drug
Convention and the EC's efforts in this regard. 2 ' Hence,
both in its internal and external policies, the EC will be a
powerful player in shaping international anti-money-launder-
ing policy.
c. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
'On June 8-10, 1990, a Caribbean drug money-laundering
conference was held in Oranjestad, Aruba. The leading govern-
ments in the region, comprising the CFATF, sent delegates
123. For additional analysis of the role of the EC in economic integration and
the regime transformation for international criminal cooperation, see Scott Carlson
& Bruce Zagaris, International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Western Europe's
International Approach to International Crime, 15 NOVA L. REV. 551-79 (1991).
124. See Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985, June
19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 143, 146-47 [hereinafter Accord]. For a discussion of" the
Accord's enforcement provisions, see Five EC Members Reach Agreement on
Schengen Accord, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 226 (1990). The Schengen Agree-
ment of June 1990 was signed to effectuate the ultimate removal of all border
controls. See 30 I.L.M. 68, 69. On November 17, 1990, Italy was the sixth state to
adopt both the Schengen Agreement and Convention.
125. In some cases, police officers from one country will be able to chase crimi-
nal suspects up to ten kilometers (6.21 miles) into a neighboring country. Five EC
Members Reach Agreement on Schengen Accord, supra note 124, at 227.
126. Accord, supra note 124, art. 70.
127. Accord, supra note 124, art. 71.
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and committed themselves to take action against drug money
laundering and to consider the forty recommendations of the
FATF of the G-7 plus twenty-one additional recommendations
of the CFATF. 28
One of the recommendations stemming from the CFATF
provides that a study be conducted to determine the extent of
drug and related money-laundering problems in the
region. 129 According to the conference report, banks and sea/-
air transport companies require study. 3 ° Other provisions
recommend that adequate resources be dedicated to fighting
money laundering and other drug-related financial crimes.
Specialized training of government authorities and law en-
forcement officials is also required in countries which lack sub-
stantial experience in combatting money laundering and other
drug-related financial crimes.' 3'
Another provision, consistent with Recommendation 5 of
the FATF, details how to criminalize money laundering and, in
particular, determine what crimes ought to constitute predicate
offenses.13 2 The Caribbean will likely follow Britain's laws,
such as the DTOA, and basic legal concepts, and will make the
predicate crimes drug-related crimes. This would criminalize
conspiracy to engage in drug trafficking, aiding and abetting
drug trafficking, money laundering, and other serious drug-re-
lated offenses. Such activities are subject to stringent criminal
sanctions in several countries.
Although the United States and other developed countries
have tried to schedule meetings with the Caribbean heads of
state or other high-ranking officials to establish agreement on
the recommendations at a higher level, some Caribbean gov-
ernments have blocked the scheduling of such a meeting. Sev-
128. The governments in attendance were: Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Cos-
ta Rica, the Dominican Republic, France, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, the Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad
and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. See Bruce
Zagaris, Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Aruba Meeting Presages Coopera-
tion by Caribbean Jurisdictions, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 217 (1990) [herein-
after Zagaris, CFATF]. For a discussion of the recommendations of the Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force, see id.
129. Id. at 218. See also 1991 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 105, at IV(3).
130. Zagaris, CFATF, supra note 128, at 218.
131. Zagaris, CFATF, supra note 128, at 219-20.
132. Zagaris, CFATF, supra note 128, at 218.
900 [Vol. XIX:3
ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING POLICY
eral Caribbean governments are not amenable to undertaking
the recommendations because their countries have important
international financial sectors which may be jeopardized by the
recommendations. Adopting these recommendations would
erode bank secrecy and confidentiality. 33
Despite the reluctance of some Caribbean governments to
take a solid position against money laundering, a workshop
was held on May 26-28, 1992, in Jamaica, to discuss the
CFATF's compliance with the forty recommendations of the
FATF and the twenty-one recommendations of the CFATF. The
workshop participants were divided into three groups; each one
evaluated data collected from participating countries on legal,
financial and technical assistance issues. The groups discussed
the development of a legislative framework required by the
Vienna UN Drug Convention to combat money laundering. The
three work groups produced papers summarizing the results of
their work. The workshop participants agreed to convene a
ministerial level meeting in October 1992, chaired by Jamaica,
to politically endorse the sixty-one recommendations of the
FATF and the CFATF and to commit to the implementation of
those recommendations and the Vienna UN Drug Convention.
The ministers were given an action agenda for securing techni-
cal assistance and training from countries experienced in com-
batting money laundering.3 4
An additional meeting is scheduled to review the progress
of each nation in adopting anti-money-laundering measures.
The participating governments will self-evaluate--as distin-
guished from the mutual evaluations of the FATF-their ac-
complishments and problems encountered in the implementa-
tion of the Vienna UN Drug Convention or recommendations.
133. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, Developments in U.S.-Bahamas Enforcement, 7
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 5, 7 (1991); for a discussion of Panama's need to
preserve confidentiality and protect its international financial sector at the expense
of cooperation, see Tim Coone, A Veneer of Normality, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1991,
at 20-21 (discussing the economy); Tim Coone, Long Road to Recover, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1991, at 20 (describing banking and finance); Lesley Crawford, An Un-
equal Partnership, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1991, at 21 (writing about U.S. assistance
to Panama).
134. For additional background on the Jamaica CFATF workshop, see Bruce
Zagaris, Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Holds Technical Workshop, 8 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 207-11 (1992).
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d. Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission
The Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD) is
an autonomous, regional organization within the Organization
of American States (OAS). When it was founded, CICAD estab-
lished an action program to counter the production and use of
illicit substances.'35 Since then, the organization has estab-
lished mechanisms to combat money laundering that may have
a long-term impact on money movement enforcement activi-
ties. 13
6
In February 1991 CICAD convened a group of experts who
prepared model anti-money-laundering laws for adoption by its
members. The expert group recommended to member countries
that legislation be passed which defines as crimes all activities
connected with the laundering of property and proceeds related
to illicit drug trafficking. 37 The laws should enable authori-
ties to identify, trace, seize, and confiscate property and pro-
ceeds related to illicit drug trafficking. The group also urges
member states to encourage financial institutions to cooperate
with the competent authorities, inter alia, to facilitate the
identification, tracing, seizure, and confiscation of illegal pro-
ceeds from laundering.
The Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses
Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses
135. The Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD) was established as a
result of an OAS conference on drug traffic held in Rio de Janeiro April 22-26,
1986. See Inter-American Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro Against the Illicit
Use and Production of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Traffic
Therein, Org. of Am. States, ch. IV, § 1(a), OAS Doc. OEA/ser. K/XXxI.1,
CICAD/doc. 22 rev. 3 (1986) [hereinafter Action Program]. The General Assembly
of the OAS established CICAD in November of 1986. G.A. Res. 813, U.N. GAOR,
41st Sess., Supp. No. 5, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986); see also Report of the Executive
Secretariat on the Status of Execution of the Statutory and Priority Projects (Article
20(e) of the Statute of CICAD): Legal Development Project Meeting of Experts on
Reinforcing the Capability of Governments to Prosecute Illicit Drug Trafficking,
OAS Doc. OEA/ser. L.XIV.3.2, CICAD/doc.81 corr.1 (1988); Zagaris & Papavizas,
supra note 1, at 119 (discussing the need to use a regional organization such as
the OAS for cooperation against narcotics trafficking).
136. The General Assembly formally adopted the Action Program at its 16th
regular session in Guatemala City in November of 1986. See Plan of Action: Edu-
cation in the Campaign Against Drug Abuse, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. LXJV.3.2, CICAD/doc. 81 add. 2, at iv (1988).
137. Report of the Executive Secretariat on the Status of Execution of Statutory
Activities and of Priority Lines of Action (Article 27(e) of the Statute of CICAD),
OAS Doc. OEA/ser. L/XIV.2.8 (1990).
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(Model Regulations) were approved by CICAD in March 1992,
and by the entire membership of the OAS at its General As-
sembly held May 18-22, 1992, in the Bahamas.'38 The Model
Regulations seek to reconcile the differences in the legal sys-
tems in the Inter-American region. The framework of the regu-
lations follows the Vienna UN Drug Convention and incorpo-
rates, whenever possible, the recommendations tendered by the
G-7 FATF.
The Model Regulations broadly define the crime of money
laundering to include any and all conversions, transfers, acqui-
sitions, or the possession or use of property by any person who
knows, should have known, or who is intentionally ignorant
that such property stems from an illicit drug traffic offense or
related offenses.'39 A laundering offense is also committed by
any person who conceals, disguises, or impedes the establish-
ment of the true nature, source, location, disposition, move-
ment, rights with respect to, or ownership of property and
knows, should have known, or is intentionally ignorant that
such property is proceeds from an illicit drug traffic offense or
related offenses.'40 These provisions address notification re-
quirements,' burden of proof,142 protection of bona fide
third parties,' and the disposition of forfeited property.'
This definition limits the scope of the crime of money laun-
dering to drug-related monies. CICAD considered broadening
the offense to cover other criminal proceeds but felt con-
strained by the Declaration and Program of Action of Ixtapa
which restricted its mandate to the drafting of model money-
laundering legis1aiion conforming to the Vienna UN Drug Convention.
1
138. Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit
Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Com-
mission (photocopy on file with authors) [hereinafter Model Regulations]. OAS
Adopts Money Laundering Proposals, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, June 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File [hereinafter Money Laundering Propos-
als].
139. Model Regulations, supra note 138, arts. 2.1-2.2.
140. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 2.3.
141. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 6.2.
142. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 6.4.
143. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 6.
144. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 7; see the introduction fo the
Model Regulations, supra note 138; see also Money Laundering Proposals, supra
note 138.
145. See Western Hemisphere Countries Follow G-7 Lead, MONEY LAUNDERING
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The Model Regulations cover not only banks, but a broad
range of "financial institutions and activities," such as brokers
and dealers in securities, currency exchange houses, check
cashing establishments, and institutions which transmit
funds. 146 All financial institutions must identify their clients
and maintain appropriate records and information on any and
all transactions in excess of a specific amount of cash to be
deterniined by the competent national authority. 147 Financial
institutions must also comply promptly with information re-
quests from the competent authorities for use in "criminal,
civil, or administrative investigations, prosecutions or proceed-
ings or for use by competent foreign authorities in accordance
with domestic law or international agreements in force." 48
In connection with the reporting of suspicious transactions,
the Model Regulations require financial institutions to report
all "complex, unusual or large transactions," or patterns of the
same, as well as any "insignificant but periodic transactions
which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose." 49
Further provisions hold financial institutions liable for the
actions of their "employees, staff, directors, owners, or other
authorized representatives" who, acting as such, participate in
any money-laundering offense or who refuse to comply with
the obligations contained in the Model Regulations. 5 ' Sanc-
tions applicable to financial institutions include "fine[s], tempo-
rary suspension of business or charter, or suspension or revo-
cation of the license to operate as a financial institution."''
Financial institutions are required to adopt and implement
procedures to ensure high standards of integrity of their em-
ployees and a system to evaluate the personal employment,
and financial histories of its employees. Ongoing training pro-
grams, such as "know your client" programs, are also re-
quired.'52 Compliance officers must be designated at the
ALERT, June 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File, for a description
of the meeting which resulted in the Declaration and Program of Action of Ixtapa,
held in April 1990 in Ixtapa, Mexico.
146. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 9.1.
147. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 10.
148. Model Regulations, supra note 138, arts. 11.1-11.2.
149. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 13.
150. Model Regulations, supra note 138, arts. 14.1 & 14.3.
151. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 14.2.
152. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 18.2.
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management level to function as liaisons with the competent
national authorities.
53
The Model Regulations also delineate the obligations of
competent national authorities that regulate and supervise
financial institutions. These authorities have the power to
grant, deny, suspend, or cancel operations of financial institu-
tions; oversee effective compliance with record keeping and re-
porting requirements; establish the necessary measures to
guard against the acquisition, participation, management, or
control of financial institutions by unsuitable persons; verify,
through regular examinations, the existence of mandatory
compliance programs; provide competent authorities with infor-
mation obtained from financial institutions in accordance with
the Model Regulations; prescribe instructions or recommenda-
tions to assist in detecting suspicious transactions; and cooper-
ate closely with competent national and/or foreign authorities
in the investigation or prosecutions of money laundering, illicit
traffic, or related offenses and violations of laws and adminis-
trative regulations dealing with financial institutions.'54
International cooperation is, in almost every sense, critical
to the control of money-laundering operations. Accordingly, the
Model Regulations recommend legislation that permits the
international issuance of and compliance with requests for
assistance in identifying, tracing, freezing, or seizing the prop-
erty, proceeds, or instrumentalities of an illicit drug trafficking
offense, with a view to its eventual forfeiture, or for investiga-
tory purposes.' Other types of international cooperation
contemplated include obtaining testimony in the requested
state, "facilitating the voluntary presence or availability in the
requesting state of persons, including those in custody, to give
testimony, locating or identifying persons, serving of docu-
ments, examining objects and places, executing searches and
seizures, providing information on evidentiary items, and exe-
cuting other measures."'56
One of the most important provisions of the Model Regula-
tions addresses the issue of bank secrecy. In conformity with
the Vienna UN Drug Convention, the Model Regulations pro-
153. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 15.
154. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 17.1.
155. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 15.1.b.
156. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 18.4.
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hibit bank secrecy or confidentiality laws from impeding com-
pliance With any of the provisions of the Model Regula-
tions."'
It is likely that the Model Regulations will be emulated by
member states. CICAD and the OAS have regular meetings at
which drugs and money laundering are discussed. They have
also created a small secretariat to dispense a questionnaire to
CICAD members to ascertain their current laws and practices
related to money laundering. Although CICAD has not signifi-
cantly influenced asset-forfeiture policy yet, its infrastructure
and continuing work will enable it to play an important role in
anti-money-laundering regime transformation in the Americas.
e. Caribbean Common Market and Community
On August 2, 1990, the heads of government of the Carib-
bean Common Market and Community (CARICOM) convened
in Kingston, Jamaica. They discussed the importance of devel-
oping mechanisms to protect regional and international bank-
ing and financial systems from subversion by international
drug traffickers. They issued a communique containing several
items of importance to international enforcement and commit-
ted their governments to supporting strategies that are being
developed in this area. They also noted the active participation
of many CARICOM states in the CFATF."58
3. Bilateral Mechanisms
The United States is a party to bilateral mechanisms
which provide for asset forfeiture in it and other signatory
countries, including MLATs,' 59 bilateral narcotics conven-
157. Model Regulations, supra note 138, art. 18.
158. See Caribbean Heads of Government Issue Communique, 6 INT'L ENFORCE-
MENT L. REP. 336 (1990).
159. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance in Crimi-
nal Matters and Ancillary Administrative Proceedings, Nov. 10, 1987, U.S.-Switz.,
27 I.L.M. 481 (1988) [hereinafter Mutual Assistance, U.S.-Switz.]; see also Treaty
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K.-Cayman Is-
lands, S. TREATY Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 26 I.L.M.
536 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K.-Cayman Islands Treaty]. For a discussion of these U.S.
MLATs, see Allan Ellis & Bob Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 151,
159, 170 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986) (discussing Italian and Moroccan treaties
providing for asset forfeiture).
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tions, 160  and extradition agreements. 16' Recent MLATs
have an article which provides that a party may notify another
when it has reason to believe that proceeds and fruits or in-
strumentalities of crime are located in the territory of the
other party. The parties are required to assist each other, to
the extent permitted by their respective laws, in procedures
relating to the immobilization, seizure, and confiscation of the
proceeds or instrumentalities of crime, as well as to restitution
and the collection of fines.
162
Bilateral provisions are advantageous because they can be
tailored to the requirements and circumstances of the two
contracting parties; whereas multilateral conventions must
necessarily find a low common denominator between numerous
states. Hence, the regime can be more specific when only two
parties are involved. Institutions, regular meetings, and plan-
ning sessions are important and should be established to main-
tain and further develop any bilateral agreements in force.
4. Unilateral Mechanisms
The laws of some countries permit identifying, tracing,
seizing, freezing, and confiscating funds as a means of assis-
tance to another country. Some countries only render legal
assistance for drug-related crimes, while other countries ex-
tend assistance to include a broader scope of crimes. The proce-
dural requirements vary. In most cases the unilateral mecha-
nisms are new or have undergone much revision and are influ-
enced by developments of global (e.g., the Vienna UN Drug
Convention) or regional (e.g., the European Laundering Con-
vention) organizations. As countries gain experience in admin-
istering anti-money-laundering and asset-forfeiture laws, pro-
posals will undoubtedly be made for the implementation and
160. For a discussion of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral narcotics agreement, see
Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assistance and Related Mat-
ters, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 339, 348-51 (1990).
161. For a discussion of U.S. extradition agreements, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITIoN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE (1987).
162. For an example of an article on immobilizing, securing, and forfeiting of
assets, see Article 11 of the Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, Dec. 9, 1987,
U.S.-Mex., S. TREATY DOC. No. 13, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1987). See also Mutual
Assistance, U.S.-Switz., supra note 159, at sec. III.
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improvement of the conventions of global and regional organi-
zations.
Domestic legislation that permits unilateral cooperation is
the easiest form of judicial assistance since it does not require
that a requesting state have a bilateral or multilateral conven-
tion mandating assistance. Once a country adopts judicial
assistance legislation, many issues arise, such as whether the
scope is broad enough, whether the procedure is accommodat-
ing and consistent with that in the rest of the world, and
whether sufficient human rights protection is available, to
name a few.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF ANTI-MONEY-
LAUNDERING
Anti-money-laundering law is new and developing quick-
ly.'63 Governments are taking unprecedented steps to encour-
age countries to enact laws, to assist them in the preliminary
stages of investigations, and to help them modernize their
procedural laws to fulfill the new bilateral and multilateral
treaties. A compilation of a restatement of international anti-
money-laundering or a type of international customary anti-
money-laundering law would be very useful in providing basic
guidelines for the development of such legislation in countries
throughout the world. The following are some of the most im-
portant principles which must be addressed if a country wishes
to enact effective anti-money-laundering legislation.
A The Requirement to Criminalize the Offense of Money
Laundering
The principle of criminalizing money laundering derives
primarily from the Vienna UN Drug Convention. Signatory
nations are obliged under international law to criminalize
money laundering. The norm of conduct and scienter require-
ment needed to criminalize participation in money laundering
differs among countries. Some countries require the transgres-
sor to understand or have knowledge of the crime, while other
treaties or laws criminalize conduct that is only negligent or
163. Examples are the European Laundering Convention, supra note 15 and
the FATF Report 1, supra note 66; see also SUMMARY DRAFT REPORT, supra note
19, 9 8.
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careless. Hence, it is important to study each convention and
law. For example, if a country requests assistance but has a
different mens rea standard than the requested state, the obli-
gation to cooperate and assist may be undermined.
B. The Erosion of Bank and Financial Privacy
Another principle of anti-money-laundering law is the
erosion of the right to financial secrecy. A regime whose objec-
tive is to combat money laundering must, by necessity, weaken
the right to financial privacy. Exceptions to the right to finan-
cial privacy have been imposed throughout the world. In sever-
al countries, attorneys and bankers must intrude on financial
privacy and understand the business of transactions of their
clients under the penalty of being responsible to society for the
failure to "know their client" or to recognize "suspicious trans-
actions."'" That is, if a lawyer or bank does not ask enough
questions, he risks the possibility of committing a crime.
C. The Requirement to "Know Your Customer"
A third principle is the requirement to "know your cli-
ent." 165 The international movement of money is greatly af-
fected by the requirement to obtain detailed information about
clients and transactions. In the United States and Australia,
this information must be transmitted to the government, which
in turn compares it against information stored in a computer
database which records tax information and information about
potentially criminal, suspicious activity.
66
France, for example, has more limited requirements;
banks and other professionals must only obtain and maintain
164. See infra notes 183-84, 224-25.
165. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 12.
166. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text. For U.S. legislation, see 31
U.S.C. § 5318(a) (1988), which gives the Secretary of the Treasury broad powers to
require reporting where wrongdoing is suspected. See also Bank Secrecy Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1951-59 (1991) (requiring banks and other financial institutions
to keep records of account holders' names, financial instruments, and major cur-
rency and international transactions).
In the United States these reports are known as "Currency Transaction Re-
ports." FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 16. Divergence of opinion
existed within the FATF on whether suspicious activity reporting should be man-
datory or permissive. See also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
MONEY LAUNDERING: A BANKERS GUIDE To AVOIDING PROBLEMS 4, 7 (1989).
1993] 909
BROOK. J. INTL L.
for some years information about their clients and certain
transactions.'67 If there is a criminal investigation, the banks
and professionals must immediately transmit this information
to the government." Presently, only banks and professionals
must do this, but pressure is being exerted, expressly by the
United States and Australia, to require that this information
be transmitted automatically to governmental authorities.169
To promote the requirement of knowing your customer,
Switzerland has terminated the right of registered interme-
diaries, such as attorneys and accountants, to be able to accept
money in the form of deposits from their clients, without re-
vealing the names and identification of such clients. Because
Switzerland has a very important financial sector, it is trying
to persuade other governments and international organizations
to take the same action so that money does not flow from their
countries to other countries with more lenient regulations.
D. The Requirement to Identify and Report Suspicious
Transactions
A fourth principle is the requirement to report "suspicious
transactions, ""'° which means that a bank must inform the
government if it observes suspicious financial activity. If a
bank or bank official does not inform the government of the
suspicious transaction, the bank or bank official is criminally
liable. The requirement to inform on a client is potentially dis-
criminatory because in adopting this requirement, some gov-
ernments, such as the United States, interpret transactions
with countries that have bank secrecy laws or offshore trust
regimes as suspicious simply because these countries them-
selves are suspected of being money-laundering havens.17
167. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
168. As of April 25, 1991, the Swiss government requires that Swiss banks
record the beneficial owners of all bank accounts. See David R. Sands, Swiss Ac-
counts No Longer Discreet, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at Al. See also Kanwar
M. Singh, Nowhere to Hide: Judicial Assistance in Piercing the Veil of Swiss Bank-
ing Secrecy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 847 (1991).
169. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 16. Divergence of opinion
existed within the FATF on whether suspicious activity reporting should be man-
datory or permissive. See also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
supra note 166, at 4, 7.
170. FATF Report 1, supra note 66, Recommendation 16.
171. See Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1892b(a)(1), 1951(a) (1991)) (allowing government agen-
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It will be important for countries to study the implementa-
tion of the suspicious transaction requirement because there is
danger that the implementation of this law will harm impor-
tant financial sectors.
E. Improving the Regulation of Professionals that Conduct
Business in the International Financial Sector
Another principle is to improve the regulation of profes-
sionals operating in the financial sector. By strictly regulating
professionals and entities operating in the financial sector,
governments may effectively deter money laundering. In many
jurisdictions, the owners and operators of companies, trusts,
financial institutions, and travel agencies and other persons
who manage money are not strictly regulated. However, coun-
tries with international banking sectors are beginning to estab-
lish regulations for these professionals and entities in an effort
to combat money laundering. 72 As has been noted in the pre-
ceeding paragraphs, the activities of lawyers are implicated in
anti-money-laundering efforts.
F. The Requirement of Asset Forfeiture
The final principle of anti-money-laundering law is the
forfeiture of property.'73 This has become so important that it
is itself now considered a subregime-the subregime of inter-
national asset forfeiture. Some laws which provide for asset
forfeiture cover only criminal activity, but other forfeiture laws
include civil and administrative actions. Many countries coop-
erate with asset-forfeiture provisions only when laws are de-
rived from the penal code. Also, some countries apply these
laws only to the proceeds and instrumentalities of drug-related
cies to obtain individual bank records). Congress provided more privacy for individ-
uals and small partnerships in the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which requires
customer authorization or a subpoena before records may-be released to the gov-
ernment. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3041 (1978) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3408 (1991)).
172. For example, in Ecuador, exchange and brokerage houses are required to
submit regular foreign currency activity reports to the Office of the Bank Examin-
er. See infra note 207 and accompanying text; see also infra note 300 and accom-
panying text for a review of French law relating to bankers and other profession-
als.
173. The Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 5.
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crimes. Other countries have more comprehensive laws encom-
passing all crimes. 74
IV. REVIEW OF THE LAWS AND POLICIES OF SELECTED
COUNTRIES
This section discusses the laws, regulations, and policies of
nine selected countries in three geographic regions: Latin
America/Caribbean, Asia/Pacific, and Europe. The combina-
tions of countries were selected to provide an overview of na-
tions which have enacted comprehensive anti-money-launder-
ing legislation, countries that have recently adopted important
measures to combat money laundering, and countries which
have strong international financial sectors, and are vulnerable
to exploitation by criminals. 175
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Bahamas was
chosen as the Caribbean country for study because of its long-
standing strong international financial and banking sectors, its
traditional role as a transhipment point, and its participation
in MLATs and other enforcement treaties. Ecuador was select-
ed as one Latin American country for review because of its
bank secrecy tradition and its many exchange houses, its bor-
ders with the main coca-growing Andean countries and, most
importantly, because it has recently taken steps to enact anti-
money-laundering laws. Uruguay was chosen as the other
Latin American subject because it has a strong international
financial sector and bank secrecy laws, has recently concluded
mutual assistance agreements, and is in the process of enact-
ing anti-money-laundering legislation.
In the Asia/Pacific region, Australia was selected because
it is clearly the country with the most comprehensive anti-
money-laundering law and has the most exemplary record of
international cooperation, especially with international organi-
zations. Japan was chosen because it is the most powerful
financial center in the region and has only recently taken steps
to implement the Vienna UN Drug Convention and to enact
anti-money-laundering legislation. Hong Kong was selected
174. See Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 2.
175. The authors would like to extend a special thanks to Heidi Jim6nez of
CICAD and Carlos Correa, Irene Barrack, Michael E. Yasofsky, Jr. and others at
the Office of Financial Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Treasury. They were extremely
helpful and provided extensive nonconfidential material and invaluable suggestions.
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because it traditionally has been a key international financial
center in the region, is alleged to have been used for launder-
ing funds derived from heroin trafficking, and has recently
taken steps to combat laundering.
In Europe, France was chosen because of its recent enact-
ment of comprehensive anti-money-laundering laws. Britain
was selected because it is one of the most important interna-
tional financial centers in the world, has one of the oldest anti-
money-laundering laws, and has key international ties through
its dependencies and the British Commonwealth. Austria was
selected because it is an example of a country that has impor-
tant bank secrecy laws, is a traditional intermediary country,
and is slowly increasing enforcement while its money-launder-
ing business allegedly increases, due to the tightening of anti-
money-laundering laws by its competitors, Switzerland, Lux-
embourg, and Italy.
A Latin America and the Caribbean
1. Bahamas
The Bahamas serves as a sterling example of a Caribbean
country which has discouraged use of its financial system for
money-laundering activity. In recent years, the Bahamian
government has signed and ratified several laws, directives,
and MLATs to encourage cooperation between it and the inter-
national community in the fight against illicit money launder-
ing. Nevertheless, the Bahamas, like other jurisdictions that
have strong international financial sectors, must remain ever
vigilant to safeguard the integrity of its financial system.'76
The following paragraphs explicate what laws and agreements
are currently in force in the Bahamas and discuss their impact
on criminal money-laundering activity.
The most comprehensive of the Bahamas' anti-money-laun-
dering laws was enacted in 1987. The statute, entitled "Tracing
and Forfeiture of Proceeds of Drug Trafficking,"'77 provides
176. For additional information regarding the Bahamas see Scott B. MacDonald
& Bruce Zagaris, Caribbean Offshore Financial Centers: The Bahamas, the British
Dependencies, and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, in INTERNATIONAL HAND-
BOOK ON DRUG CONTROL 137, 137-56 (1992).
177. Tracing and Forfeiture of the Proceeds of Drug Trafficking, 1987, ch. 86
(Bah.).
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for the confiscation of proceeds of drug trafficking, enforcement
of confiscation orders, and investigations into drug trafficking
as well as ancillary offenses relating to drug trafficking. The
salient features of the law are as follows:
1. The statute applies specifically to the proceeds of drug
trafficking and money laundering committed in the Baha-
mas and other countries. It does not extend to any other
crimes. 178
2. The statute criminalizes the following conduct: if a per-
son enters into or is otherwise involved in an arrangement
whereby-
(a) the retention or control on behalf of another's (in
this section referred to as A) proceeds of drug traffick-
ing is facilitated (whether by concealment, removal
from the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or other-
wise); or
(b) A's proceeds of drug trafficking-
(i) are used to secure funds that are placed at A's
disposal, or
(ii) are used for A's benefit to acquire property by
way of investment.'79
3. The scienter requirement is knowing or suspecting that
A is a person who carries on or has carried on drug traf-
ficking or has benefitted from drug trafficking.
4. A person guilty of an offense is liable-
(a) on conviction on information, to imprisonment for a
term of fourteen years or to a fine of $25;000 or to both;
and
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term
of five years or to a fine of $10,000 or to both.
Under the provision for forfeiture of proceeds "the amount to
178. Id. at art. 1.
179. Id. at art. 20, 1(a) & (b).
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be recovered... under the confiscation order shall be the
amount the court assesses to be the value of the defendant's
proceeds of drug trafficking."
8 0
Since enactment of this law, there were twenty-five prose-
cutions resulting in a total of ten convictions as of 1991. The
Bahamas' asset-forfeiture law is among the most comprehen-
sive of its kind in the developing world and should serve as a
precursor to further legislation designed to combat all money-
laundering activity.
Further money-laundering countermeasures adopted by
the Bahamian financial community include those promulgated
by The Association of International Banks and Trust Compa-
nies in the Bahamas. For example, a memorandum issued on
August 15, 1983, requires banks to report to the Central Bank
any attempts by persons or corporations to tender cash depos-
its in excess of $100,000 if they do not have an existing rela-
tionship with the financial institution or have not formally
established their credentials.' 1 Reporting of such informa-
tion to the Central Bank relates only to non-account holders;
therefore, no secrecy provisions appear to apply to such trans-
actions.
With regard to bank secrecy and recordkeeping, the banks
and trust companies are statutorily obligated under section 8
of The Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act to maintain
and allow access to the Central Bank to such books, vouchers,
and other records as may be needed for performance, of its
functions under the act.8 2 They are also obliged under the
Association of International Banks and Trust Companies' Code
of Conduct to follow the "know your customer" rule. 8 3 How-
ever, the Bahamas has not codified a strict and comprehensive
"know your customer" requirement.
Some foreign government and international organization
officials are eager to see the Bahamas mandate reporting of all
180. Id. at art. 7.1.
181. Memorandum from the Association of International Banks and Trust Com-
panies to All Members (Aug. 15, 1983).
182. Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act of 1965, 1965 BAH. ACTS
NO. 64, as amended by Banks and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment) Act,
1980, 1980 Bah. Acts No. 3, reprinted in Nova Scotia I.
183. ASS'N OF INT'L BANKS AND TRUST Cos. IN THE BAH., CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR MEMBERS OF ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES IN
THE BAHAMAS, pt. 2 (Jan. 17, 1985).
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suspicious transactions. Currently, reporting of suspicious
transactions is voluntary. Bahamian law allows bankers to
inform authorities of suspicious transactions without fear of
legal action by clients aggrieved by the breach in confidentiali-
ty." 4 If the banker is aware of the suspicious transaction,
failure to report it to the authorities makes him liable for pros-
ecution. 85 It appears that this would reduce the use of the
Bahamian financial system for money laundering, but author-
ities have difficulty proving whether the banker is indeed
aware of the suspicious transaction. Furthermore, permissive
rather than mandatory reporting undermines the effectiveness
of the law.
The United States has exerted pressure on the Bahamas
to sign a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA).86 The
Bahamian government is reluctant to do so, fearing that in-
vestment will be diverted from the Bahamas to other jurisdic-
tions with tighter tax secrecy laws. The Bahamian govern-
ment, together with the private sector, has adopted the official
position that the benefits of a TIEA are insignificant compared
with the detriment to the economy through loss of investment
that the agreement would cause. Therefore, such an agreement
will not likely be forthcoming.
Despite the Bahamas' reluctance to sign a TIEA, the gov-
ernment did affirm its commitment to combat illicit drug-relat-
ed activity by adopting a MLAT with the United States in
1987.187 The portion of the agreement regarding money laun-
dering is found in article 14, which stipulates that a party may
notify the other of fruits or instrumentalities of a criminal
offense believed to be in the territory of the other party, in
order that they shall, to the extent permitted by their law,
assist each other in proceedings regarding forfeiture of "fruits
and instrumentalities," restitution, or the collection of
fines. 88
184. Tracing and Forfeiture of the Proceeds of Drug Trafficking, supra note
177, art. 20 (Bah.).
185. Tracing and Forfeiture of the Proceeds of Drug Trafficking, 1987, ch. 86,
art 20(1) (Bah.).
186. See Bruce Zagaris, Developments in U.S.-Bahamas Enforcement, 7 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 1, 6 (1991).
187. Treaty with the Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June
12, 1987, U.S.-Bah., 100 U.S.T. 1988.
188. Id. at art. 14.
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Thus, Article 14 expressly authorizes assistance in the
execution of penal laws, an area in which countries do not
usually assist each other. The article is consistent with United
States law that permits equitable sharing of forfeited property
with a foreign government. 8 9 The Bahamas has signed a
similar MLAT with the United Kingdom to increase coopera-
tion in the fight against money-laundering activity.
The Bahamas' commitment to the international effort
against money laundering is also demonstrated by its ratifica-
tion of the Vienna UN Drug Convention, its active participa-
tion in CICAD, and in the first meeting of the CFATF in 1990.
The greatest barrier to full enforcement of anti-money-
laundering measures is the Bahamas' bank secrecy law which
remains among the strongest in the world. None of the laws or
conventions override the secrecy law at the present time. The
Bahamas also allows the free transfer of bearer shares,'9
which further enables money launderers to hide the identity of
the final beneficiary of shares in Bahamian companies. Once
these problems are addressed, the Bahamas will no longer
remain an attractive haven for money-laundering activity.
2. Ecuador
Money-laundering activity in Ecuador has escalated in
recent years. While Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia are countries
where a large amount of money laundering has traditionally
occurred, this activity has spread to other nations as launder-
ers seek safer havens for illicit funds. Ecuador's popularity as
a money-laundering center has increased due to the large num-
ber of currency exchange houses in the country, many of which
are situated along the borders of Colombia and Peru.' 9' In
response to this problem, Ecuador's government has passed
new laws and adopted key measures in a concerted effort to
combat the use of its financial system for money-laundering
activity. The most comprehensive of Ecuador's laws is the Law
on Illicit Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances (Narcotics
189. See 21 U.S.C. 881(e)(1)(E) (1988); 18 U.S.C. 981(1) (1988).
190. International Business Companies Act, 1990, ch. 2, § 31 (Bah.).
191. BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NAR-
COTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 430 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 NARCOTICS RE-
PORT].
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Law)'92 which criminalizes money laundering'93 and pro-
vides for penal sanctions, as well as the seizure and confisca-
tion of assets derived from criminal drug-related activities.
19 4
Ecuador also revised its Bank Secrecy Law in 1988 to prohibit
subscription and transfer of bank and company shares to per-
sons who had been named by courts as engaging in illicit traf-
ficking in drugs.' 9
In its effort to combat money laundering and to comple-
ment its domestic legislation, the Ecuadorian government
ratified the Vienna UN Drug Convention on March 23, 1990.
Ecuador is also a member of the OAS which recently adopted
model regulations to implement *the Vienna UN Convention
clauses on money laundering.'96 In addition to these mea-
sures, in 1992 Ecuador was a signatory to the Declaration of
San Antonio, a document which outlines strategies for narcot-
ics control through cooperative efforts among Bolivia, Colum-
bia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Venezue-
la.19
7
Prior to 1990, unrestricted currency exchange and
Ecuador's bank secrecy law made laundering money through
its exchange houses very convenient. On September 17, 1990,
however, the Ecuadorian legislature enacted the Narcotics Law
which made money laundering a distinct criminal offense. The
law stipulates that it is a violation to convert or transfer assets
or securities originating from drug-related activities (these
include cultivation of plants used for the manufacture of nar-
cotics, production of narcotics, and sale of controlled substanc-
es), and to use these laundered proceeds. 9 ' The law further
states that anyone who is deemed to be a producer of or an
illegal trafficker in narcotic drugs, in psychotropic substances,
or in specific chemical precursors, or who is involved in other
192. Ley Sobre Sustancias Estupefacientes y Psicotr6picas [Law on Illicit Nar-
cotic and Psychotropic Substances] 108, 1990 Registro Oficial [Official Register] No.
523 (Ecuador) [hereinafter Narcotics Law].
193. Id. at art. 55.
194. Id. at arts. 74-78, 84 & 86.
195. Reformas a la Ley General de Bancos [Reform of the General Banking
Law] 006, 1988 Registro Oficial No. 97, Art. 4 (Ecuador) [hereinafter Reform of
General Banking Law].
196. See supra notes 139-58 and accompanying text.
197. See San Antonio Drug Summit 1992, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb 22, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Allnws File.
198. Reform of General Banking Law, supra note 195, art. 3, §§ 1-9.
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crimes covered by this law, and who increases his or her net
worth by an amount not in proportion to his income, without
substantiating that the increase occurred by legal means, faces
a prison term from twelve to sixteen years. 99
Ecuador's Narcotics Law provides that anyone who inten-
tionally conceals the origin of drug proceeds, contributes to
their purchase or sale, or converts or transfers them with the
knowledge that they were obtained through the commission of
enumerated offenses, shall be punished by imprisonment for
up to eight years and fined from twenty to four thousand times
the minimum wage in Ecuador.200 Front operations and
straw men are, thus, subject to criminal sanctions under the
law. Article 78 further stipulates that
[a]nyone who lends his name or the name of the company of
which he is a part for the purpose of acquiring goods by using
resources that are derived from offenses punishable under
this law, shall be punished by an ordinary maximum prison
term of from eight to twelve years, and a fine of four to six
thousand times the prevailing minimum wage. °1
The Narcotics Law also provides for the seizure and confis-
cation of all assets derived from criminal activity. The judge is
required to seize assets from the defendant's accounts at bank-
ing and savings and loan institutions, securities, legal tender,
and negotiable instruments, such as checks, traveler's checks,
bearer bonds, bonds, and money orders or, in general, any
negotiable instrument which may be generated from the of-
fenses classified under this law.20 2 Seized assets are placed
in a special account in the Ecuadorian Central Bank run by
the National Commission for the Control of Narcotic and Psy-
chotropic Substances (CONSEP). The assets are kept in custo,
dy pending a final judicial decision of the accused's guilt or
innocence.0 3
Upon finding a defendant guilty of violating the law, the
judge may order the final confiscation of all assets and their
199. Reform of General Banking Law, supra note 195, art. 76.
200. Reform of General Banking Law, supra note 195, art. 77.
201. Reform of General Banking Law, supra note 195, art. 78.
202. Reform of General Banking Law, supra note 195, art. 86(c). See also arts.
104(d) and 107.
203. Reform of General Banking Law, supra note 195, art. 108.
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submission to CONSEP, an autonomous corporate entity func-
tioning under public law which is responsible for administering
a fund into which all confiscated assets are channelled.
CONSEP is responsible for distributing preventive information
to government agencies. 2 4 CONSEP oversees the prevention,
control, and repression of drug trafficking, and rehabilitation of
persons who are addicted to narcotics. 205 Article 110 of the
Narcotics Law provides for the restitution of assets which
CONSEP has held in safekeeping if the accused person is ab-
solved of all criminal activity.
20 6
Ecuador's banking laws do not require that the bank
"know the client" or report suspicious transactions, but do
allow the Central Bank authorities (Bank Examiner) to pay
unexpected visits and make unanticipated account examina-
tions of any bank in Ecuador at any time that the Bank Exam-
iner deems necessary for the public interest or at least once a
year.0 7 Ecuador's bank secrecy law stipulates that all reports
by the Bank Examiner shall be in writing and confidential. All
employees of the Bank Examiner are also prohibited from
revealing information contained in the reports, and violations
of this prohibition are criminally punishable.0 8 Ecuador's ac-
cession to the Vienna UN Drug Convention effectively over-
rides any bank secrecy laws in effect.
2 9
In further efforts to combat money laundering, Ecuador
modified its Banking Law in 1988 to prohibit the subscription
and transfer of the shares of banks and other entities to per-
sons who have been found guilty by a court of engaging in the
illicit traffic in drugs. If such a transfer occurs, the Bank Ex-
aminer shall annul it. 210 More recently, in July 1991, the
Bank Examiner circulated a memo to exchange houses remind-
ing them that they are obliged to maintain financial records of
all purchases and sales of foreign exchange or security broker-
age transactions.21' These records must contain the names
204. Regulations for the Application of the Law on Narcotic and Psychotropic
Substances, Exec. Decree No. 2146-A, art. 23 (Ecuador) [hereinafter Exec. Decree].
205. Narcotics Law, supra note 192, art. 13.
206. Narcotics Law, supra note 192, art. 110.
207. Ley General de Banco [General Banking Law], 1987 Registro Oficial No.
771, Art. 85 (Ecuador).
208. Id. at art. 87.
209. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 5, § 3.
210. Reform of the General Banking Law, supra note 195, art. 4.
211. Republic of Ecuador Central Bank, Circular No. DCV-91-497, MFMO 'ro
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and signatures of persons with whom the transaction is con-
ducted.212 Exchange and brokerage houses are also required
to submit a foreign currency activity report monthly and semi-
annually, or at a frequency specified by the Bank Examin-
er.21 These measures are precursors to what the internation-
al community hopes may become more stringent laws.
Ecuador's cooperation in the international fight against
money laundering has been inconsistent. Ecuador has not
signed any specific MLATs, but its ratification of the Vienna
UN Drug Convention sets forth the extent to which Ecuador
will work with foreign governments to exchange information
and effectuate law enforcement. At present, Ecuador's Narcot-
ics Law provides for reciprocal judicial assistance.2 4 Accord-
ing to that law, Ecuadorian tribunals may request assistance
from their foreign counterparts or police departments for a
judicial proceeding and for the investigation of criminal offens-
es. This assistance shall apply to, inter alia, arresting and
extraditing accused persons, producing evidence, making docu-
ments available (including bank documents), making on-site
inspections, remitting evidence, identifying and analyzing
controlled substances, and confiscating assets.21 '5 Requests for
additional assistance can be implemented by means of diplo-
macy or via INTERPOL, which is responsible for surveillance
and investigation of the crew and officers of vessels.216
Additional forms of multilateral cooperation are being
discussed in Ecuador further to tighten rules designed to com-
bat money laundering. Admirable strides have already been
taken, and Ecuador may become one of South America's most
advanced countries in terms of anti-money-laundering legisla-
tion and enforcement.
EXCHANGE HOUSES, (July 9, 1991) (excerpting art. 12(c) of banking regulations)
(copy on file with author).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Narcotics Law, supra note 192, art. 118.
215. Narcotics Law, supra note 192, art. 118.
216. Narcotics Law, supra note 192, art. 118; see also Exec. Decree, supra note
204, art. 71.
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3. Uruguay
Uruguay is one of the most important financial centers in
South America due to its strong bank secrecy laws,217 few re-
strictions on dollar accounts, lack of foreign exchange controls,
and favorable tax treatment of income and deposits. However,
law enforcement officials recognize that Uruguay's current
laws render its financial system open to abuse by narcotics
traffickers.21 Uruguayan legislative and judicial authorities
have also recognized the severity of the problem and have
taken major steps to combat money laundering. Although mon-
ey laundering is not yet a criminal offense in Uruguay, in April
1992 the legislature introduced a bill to make the laundering
of drug trafficking proceeds a crime. In further efforts to com-
bat money laundering, Uruguay has signed an MLAT with the
United States219 which provides for seizure and confiscation
of assets which are the proceeds of crime.
In addition, the Uruguayan government has signed the
Vienna UN Drug Convention. In March 1992, Uruguay (which
is the current president of CICAD) hosted CICAD's expert
group which drafted the model regulations to implement the
Vienna UN Drug Convention clauses on money laundering.
The remainder of this section will elaborate on the measures
Uruguay has taken to combat money laundering and the po-
tential effects ratification of the Vienna UN Drug Convention
will have on its legal system.
The Uruguayan judicial system has taken great strides to
curtail money-laundering activity through its financial system.
In June 1992 Uruguay's Criminal Appellate Tribunal con-
firmed the indictment and denied release from prison of a
man, E.S., charged with concealing the importation of illicit
narcotics and serving as an accomplice to extradited drug traf-
ficker Ramon Puentes Patifio. E.S. is also accused of launder-
ing funds by creating nominee, or front, companies investing in
real estate and transferring bank deposits. The Appellate Tri-
bunal refused E.S.'s request for release from prison even
217. CODIGO PENAL § 3 (Uru.).
218. 1992 NARcoTics REPORT, supra note 191, at 433.
219. Treaty between the Government of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay and
the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, May 6, 1991, U.S.-Uru., S. TREATY DOC. 19, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess., arts. 2.f, 2.g & 2.1 [hereinafter U.S.-Uru. Treaty].
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though the charges against him are only provisionally estab-
lished. To prove that E.S. participated in the alleged crimes,
Uruguay sent a judicial request for evidence to Spanish au-
thorities. E.S.'s guilt or innocence rests on the return and eval-
uation of this evidence. Uruguayan officials are quick to point
out that E.S. cannot be incarcerated indefinitely and hope that
the evidence solicited from Spain will soon be forthcoming.22 °
While money laundering is not now a distinct crime in
Uruguay, the nation's signing and ratification of the Vienna
UN Drug Convention will require Uruguay to pass a specific
law criminalizing money laundering.
On April 1, 1992, Uruguay introduced a bill designed to
conform with the provisions of the Vienna UN Drug Conven-
tion outlawing money laundering. The bill states that:
[o]ne who knows or should know the illicit origin, converts or
transfers goods, products or instruments which derive from
any of the crimes provided by this law, or crimes connected
with such, shall be punished by twenty months to ten years
in prison. If one knows or should know the illicit origin, ac-
quires, possesses, has under his control, uses in whatever
way, or realizes any type of transaction with the goods, prod-
ucts or instruments which derive from the crimes provided in
this law, or are the product of such crimes, he/she will be
subject to twenty months to ten years in prison.221
The bill further stipulates that
[olne who knows or should know the illicit origin, removes,
hides, or alters the indicators, or in whatever way impedes
the actual determination of the nature, origin, place, destina-
tion, movement, or ownership of goods, products or instru-
ments which derive from any of the crimes provided for in
this law, or crime connected, or of the relative rights of such
goods, products or instruments resulting from the activities
punished in the preceding articles, will be punished by a
term from twelve months to six years in prison.222
220. Confirman prisi6n del cdmplice de Puentes Patiho en el lavado de ddlares
[Imprisonment of Puentes Patiho's Accomplice in Money Laundering Confirmed], EL
OBSERVADOR, June 9, 1992.
221. A.b. No. 10591, ch. 9, art 56, Uru. Legislature (Apr. 1991) (photocopy on
file with author).
222. Id. at arts. 54-56.
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Further legislation is needed to conform with article 5,
section 3 of the Vienna UN Drug Convention, which provides
that each signatory "shall empower its courts or other compe-
tent authorities to order that bank, financial or other commer-
cial records be made available or be seized" and that bank
secrecy will be overridden in the case of such an order.22
3
Uruguay has a very strong bank secrecy law. Under Uruguay's
bank secrecy law, financial institutions are forbidden to give
any kind of information concerning funds, securities, or infor-
mation confidentially received, except in case of a written au-
thorization from the client. Whoever violates these provisions
will be sentenced to imprisonment from three months to three
years.224 Uruguay will have to provide legislation that over-
rides bank secrecy in order to deter money launderers from
using its financial system for illicit activity.
Until recently, Uruguayan banks were not regulated by
any "know your customer" or "suspicious transactions" report-
ing requirements. In June 1991, Uruguay's Central Bank is-
sued recommendations to prevent criminals from hiding assets
derived from illicit activity.2 ' According to the recommenda-
tions, financial institutions should require identification from
all clients opening accounts and be aware of unusual activity,
such as large cash deposits and important increases in cash
transfers. However, banks are not required to report these
data to any central authority.226
Uruguay demonstrated its commitment to improving coop-
eration in criminal matters by signing a MLAT with the Unit-
ed States. 227 The scope of mutual legal assistance to be ren-
dered increases the investigation and trial of crimes related to
drug-trafficking, including searching for, freezing, and confis-
cating drug-trafficking proceeds as well as instruments used in
223. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, arts. 7.2(f) & 7.5 ("A party
may not decline to render mutual legal assistance under this article on the ground
of bank secrecy.").
224. Sistema de Intermediaci6n Financiera [Financial Intermediation System] §
15.322, 1982 Diario Oficial 59 (Uru.).
225. BANCO CENTRAL DEL URUGUAY, COM. NO. 91/47 RECOMENDACIONES PARA
PREVENIR EL BLANQUEO DE CAPITALES PROVENIENTES DE ACTIVIDADES ILICITAS [REC-
OMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT THE HIDING OF ASSETS DERIVED FROM ILLICIT ACTIVITY]
(June 1991).
226. 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 434.
227. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219.
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the drug trade."' Assistance will also be provided when the
action that prompts the investigation, trial, and legal proce-
dures is a crime in both the petitioning and petitioned
governments.229 The agreement does not allow the official of
the petitioning government to perform acts in the territory of
the petitioned government that, in accordance with the peti-
tioned government's laws, are reserved to its officials.23 ° Nor
does the agreement allow citizens to obtain, suppress, or ex-
clude evidence, or to refuse to comply with a request for assis-
tance.23'
The assistance will consist of the following: supplying
information, documents, or other evidence; 23 2 receiving testi-
mony or depositions,233 and conducting expert appraisal and
inspections of objects and sites; locating or identifying per-
sons; 234 adopting measures aimed at seizing or freezing as-
sets; complying with requests for verification; 235 freezing,
confiscating, and transferring forfeited assets;236 transferring
persons in custody for testimony or other purposes clearly
indicated in the petition; executing requests for searches and
seizures;23 and assisting in any other way not forbidden by
the laws of the petitioned government.
In sum, Uruguay has taken decisive measures to deter
narcotics trafficking and curtail money-laundering activity
through its financial system. MLATs, judicial prosecution for
money launderers, and bills which criminalize money launder-
ing and enact provisions of the Vienna UN Drug Convention
are very significant steps. In the future, Uruguay can be ex-
pected to balance the exigencies of its international financial
sector with its constitution and legal system and to continue
its momentum towards stricter enforcement and closer cooper-
228. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, at v. & arts. 1 & 22.
229. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 5.
230. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 1.3.
231. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 1.4.
232. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, arts. 15, 21.
233. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, arts. 15-16.
234. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 20.
235. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 23.
236. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 22
237. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 21.
238. U.S.-Uru. Treaty, supra note 219, art. 2.j.
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ation with other governments in deterring money-laundering
activity.
B. Pacific-Asia
1. Australia
Australia is one of the few countries in the world which
has enacted anti-money-laundering legislation as comprehen-
sive as that of the United States. Under Australia's Proceeds of
Crime Act, money laundering is a distinct criminal offense
covering domestic and international transactionsY. 9 Austra-
lia has had a cash transactions reporting system in place since
1988, and the nation is currently considering legislation to
require that cash dealers and non-bank institutions report
international transfers and record international wire transfers.
Asset forfeiture is also covered in the 1987 Proceeds of Crime
Act.240 Although Australia's comprehensive anti-money-laun-
dering legislation serves as a deterrent, it has not completely
eradicated use of the country's financial system by money
launderers. Australia has been used as a money transfer point
for traffickers moving United States profits to Hong Kong, and
as a point from which money is wired to secret European bank
accounts. 241
As an extension of its Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters Act,242 a MLAT is now being negotiated between the
United States and Australia to facilitate seizure of drug-relat-
ed assets.2 43 Australia signed the Vienna UN Drug Conven-
tion in February 1989. The following section analyzes
Australia's anti-money-laundering laws and the impact such
legislation has had in reducing criminal activity.
The Proceeds of Crime Act provides for the seizure and
confiscation of assets derived from illegal activity, not just
drug-trafficking offenses. Assets may be restrained and kept
under the control of an Official Trustee.2' A restraining or-
der is granted where the court is satisfied that there are rea-
239. Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 87, § 81 (1987) (Austl.).
240. Id. §§ 19, 20.
241. 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 436.
242. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, No. 85 (1987) (Austl.).
243. U.S.-Switz. Treaty, supra note 159.
244. The Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 87, § 19 (1987) (Austl.).
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sonable grounds for believing that the property is tainted be-
cause of its relation to the criminal offense, or that the defen-
dant directly or indirectly derived a benefit from the offense. It
requires that the offender be convicted of the offense or is
about to be charged with an indictable offense before confisca-
tion can occur.245 Confiscated assets are channeled into a
special trust fund established to support drug education and
rehabilitation and law enforcement projects.
The Proceeds of Crime Act stipulates that a person may be
indicted if he engages in a transaction involving the proceeds
of crime or "receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of or brings
into Australia the proceeds of crime."246 One may also be in-
dicted for structuring a transaction to avoid the reporting re-
quirements established by the Cash Transaction Reports Act
(CTRA), or failing to comply generally with those reporting re-
quirements. 247
The CTRA was designed to monitor the movement of cur-
rency within Australia, and also into and out of Australia,248
in order to create a trail that can be followed by law enforce-
ment officials while investigating crimes. The act came into
effect progressively during 1990 and 1991. The CTRA man-
dates that details of suspicious financial activity and major
cash movements be reported to the Australian Cash Transac-
tion Reports Agency 4 9 where they will be analyzed and made
available to law enforcement authorities in Australia. The
CTRA prohibits the use of false name accounts with banks and
other cash dealers"' and requires verification of identity in
the opening of accounts. 2  The act further requires the fol-
lowing: reports by cash dealers on "significant cash transac-
tion[s]" of $10,000 or more,253 reports by members of the pub-
lic on cash transfers into and out of Australia of $5,000 or
more (sometimes referred to as international currency transfer
245. Id. § 43(1)(a) & (b).
246. Id. § 81(3)(b).
247. Cash Transactions Reports Act (1988) (Austl.) [hereinafter CTRA].
248. See id. § 6.
249. Id. § 16. This agency is also commonly known as Austrac.
250. Id. § 4(3).
251. Id. § 24.
252. Id. §§ 18, 20.
253. Id. §§ 3, 7.
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reports),254 and reports on suspicious financial activity from
cash dealers. 5
Under the CTRA, cash dealers include cash carriers, finan-
cial institutions, banks, building societies, credit unions, finan-
cial corporations, insurance companies, insurance intermediar-
ies, securities dealers, futures brokers, managers, trustees of
unit trusts, firms that deal in travelers checks and money
orders, currency and bullion dealers, and casinos and gambling
houses." 6 The Australian Cash Transaction Reports Agency
has issued guidelines to the above institutions to help them
determine what a suspicious transaction is, and when and how
it should be reported. 7 All of the requisite reported data are
compiled and held by the Cash Transaction Reports Agency.
Computerized access to these data is available to Australia's
relevant taxation and law enforcement officers to aid them in
investigating criminal activity.5
In 1992 Australia passed a Mutual Assistance and Busi-
ness Regulations Act, which allows it to make agreements with
other countries for the exchange of information.- 9 Also in
1992 Australia signed a mutual assistance treaty with South
Korea which signifies their willingness to cooperate in the
investigating and prosecuting of crimes.
Australia has taken the greatest initiative of all the ha-
tions in the Pacific Basin in enacting anti-money-laundering
legislation. Its laws serve as comprehensive models for the
region and the rest of the world. International law enforcement
authorities hope that Australia's legislation will inspire other
countries in the Pacific to enact tougher laws to fight money
laundering.
254. Id. § 15.
255. Id. § 16.
256. Id. § 3(1).
257. Id. §§ 3, 7.
258. Id. § 27.
259. See Australia's New Australian Securities Chief Sees Better Inter-Agency
Cooperation, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Jan. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Intl File.
260. See Australia, South Korea Sign Treaty in Combatting Crime, XINHUA
GEN'L NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File.
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2. Japan
Prior to enacting its "Narcotics and Psychotropic Control
Law and Other Laws to Suppress Acts Promoting Illegal Drug
Trafficking under International Cooperation" (Drug-Trafficking
Law)26 1 on October 2, 1991, Japan was bereft of any financial
control laws authorizing narcotic enforcement officers to seize
or confiscate funds acquired through drug trafficking. Passage
of this law enables Japan to combat money laundering and
exploitation of its financial system by Japan's organized crime
syndicates, the "boryokudan."262
At present, Japan has no specific bank secrecy statutes.
Rather, tradition and tacit agreement within the banking com-
munity keep records confidential making it nearly impossible
for law enforcement officials to examine the financial records of
drug traffickers. The new law somewhat displaces tradition by
criminalizing money laundering and requiring financial insti-
tutions to report suspicious accounts and transactions to cen-
tral authorities.
In addition to enacting this legislation, Japan has also
signed the Vienna UN Drug Convention, and is a member of
the FATF, the CECD, and the Basle Committee. Although
Japan has not signed any MLATs with other nations, it has
enacted a statute, International Assistance in Investiga-
tion,263 which is intended "to provide a foreign country, at its
request, with evidence necessary for the country to investigate
a criminal case."264 The following analysis will summarize
the salient features of the anti-money-laundering law enacted
in 1991 and discuss its impact on Japanese bank secrecy and
criminal law enforcement.
Japan's new Drug-Trafficking Law defines "illicit proceeds"
as property obtained by means of a criminal act constituting a
drug offense or obtained as reward for such an act, or money
offered or transported in the commission of an offense pre-
scribed in item 7.265 The anti-money-laundering provisions of
261. KEIHO, Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law and Other Laws to Sup-
press Acts Promoting Illegal Drug Trafficking, Oct. 1991 [hereinafter Drug-Traf-
ficking Law] (translated photocopy of document on file with authors).
262. 1992 NARCOTIcs REPORT, supra note 191, at 438.
263. Keiji Soshoho (Code of Criminal Procedure), Law No. 69 of 1980.
264. Id. at art. 1(1).
265. The offenses proscribed in item 7 include intentional offering or transport-
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the law stipulate that a person who derives property from
illicit proceeds, including "property obtained as fruit of, or in
exchange for, illicit proceeds, or property obtained in exchange
for such property, 2 66 contravenes the law and that "[any
person who knowingly receives property related to illicit pro-
ceeds shall be punished with imprisonment at forced labor for
not more than 3 years, or a fine of not more than one million
yen, or both. 2 6' The enactment of this law demonstrates that
Japan is committed to deterring use of its financial system for
money laundering. However, bank secrecy will have to be fully
overcome before this occurs.
Japan has no statute which preserves banking secrecy.
Nevertheless, legal scholars and courts have held that a bank
or financial institution has the legal duty not to disclose infor-
mation regarding the banking transactions of its clients with-
out proper reasons. This is based both on the contract between
the bank and its clients and on customary practice in Japan.
The bank's duty to maintain secrecy extends to information re-
lating to all business and personal affairs of which it becomes
aware through transactions involving the client. The Drug-
Trafficking Law breaks with tradition by ordering banks to
report "suspicious transactions" to authorities and report for-
eign currency conversion of five million yen (U.S. $40,000) and
30 million yen (U.S. $234,000) for domestic currency transac-
tions to the Ministry of Finance through the Bank of Japan.
International cooperation by Japan is important because it
is the Pacific region's wealthiest and most politically prominent
nation. Its International Assistance in Investigation law is ex-
tensive and provides specifically for cooperation with interna-
tional criminal police organizations. 8 Japan's international
stature compels it to take a leading role in developing an anti-
money-laundering regime.
Japan's Drug-Trafficking Law brings it closer to conformi-
ty with the provisions of the Vienna UN Drug Convention.
Supporting legislation is being developed in Japan further to
ing money, land, building, ship, aircraft, machine, equipment, or material for ille-
gal importation, exportation or production of controlled drugs. Drug-Trafficking
Law, supra note 261, art. 2.3.
266. Drug-Trafficking Law, supra note 261, art. 2(4).
267. Drug-Trafficking Law, supra note 261, art. 10.
268. Keiji Soshoho (Code of Criminal Procedure), Law No. 69 of 1980, art. 17.
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combat money laundering, and international authorities expect
that Japan will soon have complete and comprehensive laws in
place to deter criminal activity through its financial system.
3. Hong Kong
Hong Kong is strategically located in the Pacific Rim and
is one of the four major financial centers of the world. There-
fore, it attracts money-laundering activity. Despite measures
designed to curb drug money laundering, extensive laundering
activity still occurs in Hong Kong, often through gold shops,
trading companies, and money changers as well as the tradi-
tional banking and financial institutions."9 This section re-
views the laws and initiatives Hong Kong has taken to combat
money laundering.
The Drug Trafficking Recovery of Proceeds Ordinance (the
Ordinance) effectively criminalizes drug-related money laun-
dering by providing that persons may be arrested for assisting
another to retain or control drug proceeds.Y° This law allows
law enforcement officials to confiscate proceeds "in relation to
benefits derived from" drug trafficking.2 ' To further its drug-
related asset seizure and confiscation provisions, Hong Kong
signed a drug designation agreement with the United States in
January 1991, which establishes a reciprocal basis for the en-
forcement of confiscation orders against drug assets. The shar-
ing of confiscated assets is being discussed by the two nations,
but the Hong Kong government is reluctant to agree to share
the $45 million it has seized thus far. 22
Bank secrecy continues to be a barrier to effective anti-
money-laundering law enforcement, but enactment of the Ordi-
nance is a first step toward overcoming Hong Kong's bank
secrecy. The legislation makes those who assist persons in
retaining the proceeds or benefits of drug trafficking criminally
liable. Section 25 of the Ordinance provides, inter alia, for
269. 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 437.
270. See Graham C. Grant, Money Laundering: Legislative and Enforcement
Developments in Hong Kong (undated) (on file with authors) for an explanation of
Hong Kong statute, The Drug Trafficking Recovery of Proceeds Ordinance, 1989,
(H.K.); id. at 2 (explaining that § 25(1) of the DTOA defines those persons who
may be tried under the statute).
271. Id. at 12.
272. See 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 437.
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criminal sanctions for bank staff who fail to make required
reports to the authorities related to drug trafficking.2 3 The
statute says:
Subject to subsection (3), a person who enters into or is other-
wise concerned in an arrangement whereby-
(a) the retention or control by or on behalf of another
("the relevant person") of the relevant person's proceeds
of drug trafficking is facilitated (whether [by] conceal-
ment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer to nomi-
nees or otherwise) [is subject to punishment];. 4
A person unable to give a legitimate excuse for his failure
to make disclosure of a suspicious transaction.7 5 is liable up-
on conviction for a fine of H.K. $5,000,000 and may be impris-
oned for fourteen years. 6 Summary conviction makes one
liable for a fine of H.K. $500,000 and imprisonment for three
years. 7
The Ordinance provides that when "a person discloses to a
constable a suspicion or belief that any funds or investments
are derived from or used in connection with drug-traffick-
ing ... the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any
restriction upon the disclosure of information imposed by con-
tract [statute or otherwise]... ,,27" neither banks nor their
staffs will be in breach of their duty of confidentiality. The
Hong Kong Association of Banks, together with the Commis-
sioner for Narcotics, the Royal Hong Kong Police, and the
Customs & Excise Departments, established guidelines to
assist bank staff in identifying suspicious transactions. 9
Financial institutions are not required to maintain records
of large currency transactions, and there have been no cur-
rency control regulations in Hong Kong since 1973. Without
exchange controls, investment income and capital may be
273. See GRANT, supra note 270, at 7.
274. See GRANT, supra note 270, at 4 (§ 25).
275. See GRANT, supra note 270, at 4 (excerpting § 25.4 which provides for
defenses to charges of aiding and abetting).
276. See GRANT, supra note 270, at 4 (§ 25.5(a) reprinted in text).
277. See GRANT, supra note 270, at 4 (§ 25.5(b) reprinted in text).
278. See GRANT, supra note 270, at 4 (§§ 25.6-25.7 reprinted in text).
279. See Letter from Commissioner of Banking, Hong Kong to Chief Executive
Officers of All Banks (on file with authors); see also Letter from the Hong Kong
Association of Banks to Chief Executive Officers of All Banks (on file with au-
thors).
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transferred and repatriated without restriction, thereby provid-
ing a convenient means to launder money. Hong Kong's Bank-
ing Ordinance, enacted in 1990, does allow investigations on
behalf of the Financial Secretary
[i]f it appears to the Commissioner [of Banking] that it is in
the interest of depositors of an authorized institution or a for-
mer authorized institution or in the public interest that an
inquiry should be made into the affairs of that institu-
tion .... 280
In sum, although financial institutions maintain a high
level of secrecy, they are required to cooperate with and pro-
vide information to authorized investigators.
In June 1991 the United Kingdom ratified the Vienna UN
Drug Convention. Ratification will extend to Hong Kong as
soon as the territory has enacted the complying legislation.
Hong Kong has initiated compliance by proposing an organized
crime bill-similar to the United States' Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute2 M-which will
make the laundering of all, not just drug-related, proceeds of
organized crime an offense.
The Ordinance of 1989 and the introduction of a bill to
criminalize the laundering of the proceeds of organized crime
indicate that the Hong Kong Government is taking stronger
enforcement measures against drug trafficking and money
laundering. Tension continues between the banking communi-
ty, which wishes to maintain bank secrecy, and law enforce-
ment officials, who wish to enact stronger legislation. It is
expected that the international call for legislative measures to
combat money laundering will overcome resistance in Hong
Kong's financial community and that stricter statutes will soon
be enacted.
C. Europe
1. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is the largest financial center in
Europe and, therefore, highly susceptible to money-laundering
280. Banking Ordinance, ch. 155, § 117.1 (1990) (H.K.).
281. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1956, 1957 (1988).
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activity. England has led Europe in enacting anti-money-laun-
dering legislation and to date has the most comprehensive and
extensive regulations in place for combatting money launder-
ing. The United Kingdom's commitment is demonstrated by its
ratification of the Vienna UN Drug Convention, its drafting
and signing the European Laundering Convention, and its
membership in the FATF, the OECD, the EC (therefore subject
to community policy on money laundering), the CFATF, and
the Basle Committee. The United Kingdom has also signed an
MLAT with the United States concerning the Cayman Is-
lands.2 This section reviews the extent to which the United
Kingdom has been active in developing and promoting anti-
money-laundering and asset-forfeiture regimes.
The most significant legislation developed in the United
Kingdom, thus far, to address the problems associated with
money laundering is the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986
(DTOA).28 ' This act came into force in January 1987 and con-
tains provisions for the investigation of suspected drug-derived
assets prior to arrest,284 the freezing of assets,28 5 and the
issuance .of confiscation orders following conviction.8 6 Under
the statute it is an offense to assist a drug trafficker in retain-
ing proceeds of drug trafficking. This conduct is punishable by
a maximum of fourteen years' imprisonment, or a fine, or
both.28 7 The relevant section of the statute states:
(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, if a person enters into or
is otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby-
(a) the retention or control by or on behalf of another
(call him "A") of A's proceeds of drug trafficking is facili-
tated (whether by concealment, removal from the juris-
diction, transfer to nominees or otherwise), or
(b) A's proceeds of drug trafficking-
(i) are used to secure that funds are placed at A's
disposal, or
(ii) are used for A's benefit to acquire property by
way of investment, knowing or suspecting that A is
a person who carries on or has carried on drug traf-
282. U.S.-U.K.-Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 159.
283. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act (DTOA), 1986, ch. 32 (Eng.).
284. Id. § 409.
285. Id. §§ 8(6) & 8(7).
286. Id. § 409.
287. Id. § 1305.
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ficking or has benefited from drug trafficking, he is
guilty of an offence.'
The statute provides that it is a defense if the alleged
launderer did not know or suspect that the proceeds were the
fruits of drug trafficking. 8 9 The DTOA provides courts with
the power to seize and confiscate assets representing proceeds
of drug trafficking. This power is exercised upon conviction of a
person of a drug-trafficking offense.290 The court makes an
order requiring the defendant to pay an amount equal to the
court's assessment of his proceeds from drug trafficking at any
time (not just in connection with the offense for which he has
just been convicted).
The DTOA stipulates that reporting suspicious transac-
tions to authorities will not be treated as a breach of confiden-
tial duty between the financial institution or its employee and
the person suspected of laundering money. Financial institu-
tions are immune from suits arising from the reporting of
suspicious activity. Voluntary. disclosure of suspicious activity
is made to the National Drugs Intelligence Unit. Mandatory
disclosure of suspicious transactions, identification of account
holders, and the exercise of due diligence in dealing with suspi-
cious transactions are being proposed as amendments to the
act.291 These improvements should be implemented by
1993292 and would follow the EC Money-laundering Directive.
The United Kingdom is unique in that once a financial
institution reports a suspicious transaction, the authorities
report back to the institution on the progress made in the
investigation. Follow-up is complete and has resulted in a
refined awareness within the financial community of the ex-
tent of money laundering and prosecutions resulting from
suspicious transactions reporting. Such close cooperation be-
tween the authorities and financial institutions serves as a
model for other countries that require reporting of suspicious
transactions, but do not keep the financial institution updated
on the progress the investigating authorities have made.
288. Id. § 24.
289. Id. § 24(4).
290. Id. § 38.
291. European Laundering Convention, supra note 15.
292. 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 459.
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To combat money laundering further, the United Kingdom
enacted legislation that extended the scope of the DTOA. The
Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act of 1990
makes it an offense to conceal, disguise, convert, transfer, or
remove from the jurisdiction of the courts property derived
from the proceeds of drug trafficking for the purpose of assist-
ing any person to avoid either prosecution for a drug-traffick-
ing offense or the issuance or enforcement of a confiscation
order.
29 3
Additional anti-money-laundering legislation has recently
been passed in the United Kingdom.294 Implementation of
the EC Money-laundering Directive is underway, which would
require authorities to apply basic customer identification and
record keeping requirements to currency exchange houses.
These businesses are being used increasingly for money-laun-
dering purposes, but are not currently subject to regulation.
The United Kingdom is also considering extending the scope of
the money-laundering offense to cover the proceeds of all seri-
ous crimes, not just drug trafficking.
Besides enacting drug and terrorist anti-money-laundering
legislation,295 the United Kingdom has adopted several regu-
latory requirements for financial institutions to deter money
launderers and improve law enforcement. It has adopted the
Principles which apply to "knowing the customer." The Princi-
ples require customer identification upon establishing a trans-
action relationship, cooperation with law enforcement author-
ities to the extent permitted without breaching customer confi-
dentiality, keeping internal records of any transaction, and
training staff about money laundering. Widespread dissemina-
tion of information and training about money-laundering activ-
ity are key objectives within the United Kingdom, and this is
demonstrated by the publication of money-laundering guidance
notes for various financial sectors, drawn up jointly by the
293. The Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act, 1990, ch. 5, § 14(1)
& (2) (Eng.).
294. According to a recent Financial Regulation Report article, two pieces of
legislation were recently enacted: The Criminal Justice Act of 1993 and the Money
Laundering Regulation of 1993. In addition, "guidance notes" will be published to
outline reporting procedures and explain training programs for employees of banks
and financial institutions. Money Laundering Legislation, FIN. REG. REP., Sept.
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File.
295. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, § 11 (Eng.).
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relevant trade associations, the Central Bank, and law enforce-
ment authorities.296
The extensive legislation and regulations currently in
place reflect the United Kingdom's unwavering dedication to
the fight against money laundering. Recently, the FATF con-
cluded that the United Kingdom continues to demonstrate a
strong commitment to developing and maintaining an effective
and comprehensive system to combat money laundering.
297
2. France
The French government has been extremely attentive to
the problem of money laundering and has enacted comprehen-
sive legislation and approved numerous regulations to deter
money launderers from abusing its financial system. The
laundering of proceeds derived from drug trafficking is a dis-
tinct criminal offense in France, and the legislation provides
for asset seizure upon indictment and forfeiture upon
conviction.29
The French financial system has historically served as a
transit point for drug funds moving through Europe and be-
tween Europe and South America.299 To discourage this,
France established TRACFIN, °° a special office which tar-
gets suspected narcotics-related money-laundering operations.
TRACFIN gathers information from the banking community
and shares it with police and customs intelligence so that they
may track money-laundering activity. Banks are required by
law to report suspicious transactions to TRACFIN. In addition
to the steps taken domestically to deter money laundering,
TRACFIN exchanges information with foreign counterparts
296. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 1991/1992 Report
14 OECD Press Release (OECD Press Division, Paris, France) (June 22, 1992)
[hereinafter FATF Report 2]. Examples of such guidelines are the Money Launder-
ing, Guidance Notes for Insurance Business and Money Laundering, Guidance Notes
for Banks and Building Societies.
297. Id.
298. See infra notes 300 and accompanying text.
299. 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 447.
300. TRACFIN is short for Cellule de coordination chargde du traitement du
renseignement et de l'action contre le circuits financiers clandestins. See Fady M.
Zeidan, Drug Trafficking in France, in BUTTERWORTH'S J. INT'L BANKING & FIN.
168 (1991). See Money Laundering Law Passed, Sept. 1990, FIN. REG. REP., avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter TRACFIN Law].
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under conditions of reciprocity and confidentiality (e.g., with
the United Kingdom's National Drug Intelligence Unit and the
Australian Cash Transaction Reports Agency). French and
United States Customs also have a bilateral agreement which
allows a free flow of information on money-laundering investi-
gations.
As a demonstration of its commitment to controlling mon-
ey-laundering activities, France ratified the Vienna UN Drug
Convention, which became fully effective as of March 31, 1991.
France is also a member of the FATF, the OECD, the CFATF,
and the EC, and, therefore, is subject to community policy on
money laundering. France also participated in the drafting of
the European Laundering Convention. No MLATs are in force
between France and other nations, and French law currently
limits the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct under-
cover operations. For example, its law hinders enforcement
efforts by preventing United States undercover agents from
making pickups of drug proceeds from French sources or mak-
ing deposits in French banks as requested by drug dealers.3 'O
However, legislation is pending which, if approved, would au-
thorize customs agents and police to do undercover operations.
The remainder of this section will delineate the salient
features of the anti-money-laundering legislation in effect in
France, take a closer look at the operations of TRACFIN, and
give an update of the measures taken by France's private in-
dustry to deter money-laundering activity.
Law No. 87-1157, Loi Chaladon,°2 dated December 31,
1987 made money laundering a criminal offense. The penalties
provided by article L 627, paragraph 3, of the Code of Public
Health, punish those "who, in full knowledge, contributed to
laundering of proceeds resulting from drug law violation."3 3
This provision thus provides for legal action against those who,
while not traffickers, play a part in financial or investment
operations involving their proceeds. 0 4 Penalties include im-
prisonment from two to ten years and fines ranging from 5,000
301. 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 448.
302. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, MONEY LAUNDERING REVIEW OF THE EXIST-
ING RULES IN FRANCE 2 (May 1989) (photocopy of document on file with authors).
303. Id. at 2.
304. Id.
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to 500,000 francs.0 5 Other sections of this law provide for
the seizure and confiscation of property of traffickers. 0 6
The 1989 law on finance, No. 88-1149, creates a new cus-
toms law which criminalizes financial operations between
French and foreign entities which involve funds derived from
drug-law violations.3 7 The sanctions also include from two to
ten years' imprisonment, confiscation of money involved, and a
fine ranging from one to five times the sums involved in the
violation.08
France's most recent law to combat money laundering,
Law No. 90-614,309 relates to the participation of financial in-
stitutions in the laundering of drug-trafficking proceeds. The
main provisions of this law impose a duty of disclosure on
"Professionals" and "Financial Institutions."310 If profession-
als, including notaries, auditors, and legal advisors, are aware
of transactions involving funds derived from illegal drug activi-
ties, they are required to disclose the information to the Public
Attorney. Financial institutions disclose whether funds held by
them or transactions with which they are involved derive from
or are connected with illegal drug activities. The disclosure
must be made to TRACFIN.31'
TRACFIN may request and gather information from finan-
cial institutions and professionals regarding the source of the
funds or the nature of transactions disclosed and may, if ap-
propriate, alert the General Prosecutor. TRACFIN is obligated,
subject to certain exceptions, to keep all information it receives
confidential. When financial institutions make a disclosure,
TRACFIN delivers an "acknowledgement of receipt" which can
be accompanied by an order to freeze the funds or delay the
transaction concerned for a twelve-hour period. TRACFIN or
the Public Attorney may request in court that this period be
extended or that the funds, accounts, or securities which are
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Zeidan, supra note 300, at 168.
310. Zeidan, supra note 300. Financial institutions include banks and other
institutions governed by the Banking Law of 1984, such as the Treasury, insur-
ance companies, companies known as "mutuelles" (mutual insurance companies),
stockbroking companies, and currency exchange dealers. Zeidan, supra note 300.
311. See Zeidan, supra note 300; see also TRACFIN Law, supra note 300.
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the subject of the disclosure be temporarily sequestered. If no
order accompanies the "acknowledgement of receipt" from
TRACFIN, or if no court order has been issued, the financial
institution may proceed with the transaction. Disclosure must
also be made and an acknowledgement of receipt delivered in
cases where 1) the transaction has already been executed be-
cause it was impossible to delay; or 2) it appears, after its
execution, that the funds involved derived from drug-related
activities. The new law eliminates any liability for breach of
client confidentiality and, makes it an offense for financial
institutions or professionals to reveal to the owner of the funds
that disclosure to TRACFIN or to the Public Attorney has been
made.
12
Financial institutions must also "know their customer" by
requiring proof-of-identity documents upon account opening.
They must also check the identity of an "occasional" client who
requests a transaction exceeding 50,000 francs or who wishes
to use safe custody services. The law further provides that
financial institutions must scrutinize transactions exceeding
one million francs. In such cases the financial institution must
keep a record for five years of the characteristics of the trans-
actions-including the origin and destination of funds-and
report them to TRACFIN.313
After France succeeded to the presidency of the FATF in
1990, it adopted measures which are often more stringent than
those contained in the FATF recommendations. Included
among the French initiatives is the compulsory reporting of
suspicious transactions for all financial and nonfinancial pro-
fessionals. In addition, the French government has worked ac-
tively with banking and insurance trade associations to assist
them in issuing recommendations for their members and insti-
tuting training programs for employees to ensure the effective-
ness of the recommendations.1 4 International law enforce-
ment officials hope that France will extend its anti-money-
laundering legislation to cover all serious criminal offenses in
addition to offenses connected with drug trafficking. Overall,
France has recognized money laundering as a serious problem
312. Zeidan, supra note 300, at 169.
313. See description of TRACFIN in TRACFIN Law, supra note 300; see also
Zeidan, supra note 300.
314. FATF Report 2, supra note 296, at 10.
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and has taken admirable steps to combat it. Its wide-ranging
initiatives will possibly serve as an example to other nations in
continental Europe which have yet to implement anti-money-
laundering legislation.
3. Austria
Prior to 1991, Austria's banking and commercial systems
were popular havens for illicit funds derived from criminal
narcotic and other illegal activities.3 5 Financial experts and
foreign government officials attribute the exponential increase
in laundering activity to Austria's strict bank and tax secrecy
laws,316 stable government, and convenient geographic loca-
tion. In addition, because Austria is not a member of the EC, it
is not subject to the treaties and laws regarding disclosure of
financial information, such as the European Laundering Direc-
tive, that regulate the anti-money-laundering regime of the
members of the EC.
Austria's bank and tax secrecy laws serve as powerful
magnets to attract illegal funds and money-laundering activity
away from other traditional havens such as Switzerland. The
result is that Austria has become one of Europe's key financial
centers for hiding cash and securities derived from the pro-
ceeds of criminal activity.
Austria's bank secrecy law, set out in the Kredit-
wesengesetz (KWG) of November 1986, section 23, mandates
strict confidentiality for individual and business client ac-
counts. 17 The law states that banks, their organization
members, employees, and persons otherwise connected with
the bank's business activity, and persons exclusively bound by
a confidential business relationship with the bank's clients, are
expressly forbidden to disclose or use financial information
derived from their business relationship with those clients.1
Any Austrian federal agency, such as the Austrian central
bank (Osterreichischen Nationalbank), which is privy to confi-
dential information through the course of its official duties, is
315. 1992 NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 191, at 445.
316. Dr. Geiserich Tichy, Osterreich-Nationalberichterstatter, in LXXVlb C.D.
Fisc. INT'L 181-90 (1991).
317. Bankgeheimnisgesetz § 23, 1986 KREDITWESENGESETZ Abs. [Paragraphs] 1
and 2 (Aus.).
318. Id.
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also bound to the same level of secrecy. 319
The exceptions to the bank secrecy law are few and stipu-
late that the Austrian Finance Minister will only distribute
confidential information collected from Austrian federal agen-
cies to foreign banking regulatory authorities when to do so
would not threaten public order, when Austria shares the same
interest in the investigation as the inquiring country, and
when there are common objectives between the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Austria's federal laws. 320 Austria has a vested eco-
nomic interest in maintaining the strictest bank secrecy laws
possible without losing respect internationally or incurring dis-
approval or sanctions from foreign nations which are active in
combatting drug-related activity.
Austria's popularity as a haven for money-laundering
activity can be attributed partly to Austria's nonmembership in
the EC, which means that it is not subject to the EC's treaties,
laws, and regulations. The flow of capital to Austria can be
linked to a rise in investment in Austrian corporations and
other Austrian securities instruments.
Foreign investors who wish to purchase bearer shares in
Austrian companies through the Vienna Stock Exchange may
do so without restriction." Other major investment instru-
ments which are issued in bearer form are medium- and long-
term domestic bonds, mortgage and local-authority bonds, and
cash deposit certificates. 22 Securities issued in bearer form
provide anonymity for the purchaser of the instrument, there-
by facilitating investment in legitimate instruments with illicit
funds. Once the securities are purchased they are often kept in
custody with Austrian banks which administer the client port-
folio without ascertaining the final beneficiary of the bearer
certificates. This makes investment in Austrian shares very
attractive to money launderers.
Austria has come under increasing fire because of its strict
bank and tax secrecy laws and its resulting vulnerability to
money launderers. In an effort to counter criticism, the Austri-
an Central Bank, together with the Austrian Bankers Associa-
tion, issued a "Declaration of Principles of Special Care of the
319. Id.
320. Id. § 23a.
321. DOING BUSINESS IN AUSTRIA 32 (Price Waterhouse, Vienna, Austria 1989).
322. BUSINESS IN AUSTRIA 62-63 (Creditanstalt, Vienna, Austria 1990).
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Austrian Banking Industry" (Declaration).323 The Declaration
stipulates that Austrian banks "will neither aid nor abet any
transactions which they have reason to suspect serve money-
laundering activities,"324 and they will "cooperate fully with
the authorities within the limits established by the governing
law.
32 5
If banks suspect that funds have been obtained counter to
the intentions of the Declaration, they are required to break off
relations with the relevant customer.326 The Declaration fur-
ther provides that prior to conducting business with a custom-
er, the banks will make an appropriate review depending on
the size and type of account or deposit to be opened.327
The Declaration also provides:
1) If U.S. dollar notes in sums of $50,000 or more are deposit-
ed for any purpose whatsoever with an Austrian bank, the
bank shall in every case establish beyond a reasonable doubt
and record the identity and address of the depositor.
2) Banks shall send notes which they have reason to suspect
originate from criminal offenses to the United States for
deposit and credit. The depositor of the United States notes
shall be informed that according to American regulations the
bank is required to give information about the conversion of
bank notes in excess of $10,000 into account balances and
that the Austrian banks will therefore have to disclose the
identity of the depositor in case of an inquiry by the Ameri-
can bank.
3) The Austrian bank shall report the volume of such bank
notes and the name of the American bank to which they are
being sent to the Austrian central bank prior to dispatching
the bank notes to the United States.
4) United States dollar notes in amounts of U.S. $50,000 or
more will not be traded on the Vienna Exchange. 28
323. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF SPECIAL CARE OF THE AUSTRIAN BANKING
INDUSTRY (1992) (photocopy on file with authors).
324. Id. at 2, 9 2.
325. Id. at 2, 9 3.
326. Id; see also id. at 2-3, 9 6.
327. Id. at 2, 9 1.
328. Id. at 5.
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It should be noted that the records of transactions and finances
and personal client data are for bank internal use and are
reported only in the situations specifically enumerated.
The Declaration also describes the criminal liability for
those who engage in money-laundering activity. 29 The Decla-
ration notes that sections 12 and 15 of the Austrian Penal
Code provide for recovery of any profits and confiscation and
forfeiture for complicity in any criminal offense, including
drug-related offenses. 330 A new agreement between the Aus-
trian Nationalbank and the banking industry reached in Janu-
ary 1992 requires Austrian banks to determine the identity of
customers who conduct foreign currency transactions involving
more than 200,000 schillings (U.S. $20,000). The prior limit
was U.S. $100,000 and applied only to United States dollars,
not to other foreign currencies.13 ' Authorities expect that this
will decrease the use of Austria's financial system for money
laundering. However, other experts maintain that money laun-
derers have many means to circumvent the requirement. For
instance, they can simply bypass the identity requirements by
not conducting foreign currency transactions in excess of
200,000 schillings. Furthermore, anyone may convert foreign
currency into schillings abroad and legally import them to
Austria and deposit them with a bank.
The Declaration and other recent regulations are gestures
made by the Austrian banking industry which indicate that it
is interested in combatting money laundering. However, this
Declaration is not binding and provides no penalties for non-
compliance, nor does it override the Bank Secrecy Law332
which governs the industry.
Some experts have criticized Austria's banking system for
its secrecy and poor financial reporting. A recent study con-
ducted by accountants KPMG Peat Marwick and Lafferty Busi-
ness Research rates Austrian banks among the worst in the
world for the provision of financial information such as state-
329. Id. at 3, 99 6-7; id. at 4, 9 1-2.
330. Id. at 3, 99 6-7; id. at 4, 9 1.
331. Report by "Sy," Banks to Take Measures Against "Drug Money", FOREIGN
BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-WESTERN EUROPE (FBIS-WEUR), 14 Jan.
1992, at 7.
332. Bankgeheimnisgesetz § 23, 1986 KREDITWESENGESETZ Abs. [para-
graphs] 1 and 2 (Aus.).
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ments on accounting policies, nonperforming loans, and strate-
gy statements. The report concludes that "Australian and Ca-
nadian banks provide the best quality information in their
annual accounts while their German and Austrian competitors
[provide] the worst ....
While the Austrian national bank has taken steps to moni-
tor the movement of money, such as those outlined in the Dec-
laration, international pressure on Austria to enact tougher
money-laundering countermeasures has also continued. On
March 2, 1992, United States authorities arrested a prominent
Austrian banker, Michael Margules, on suspicion of money
laundering. The charges against Mr. Margules were based on
an alleged conversation with a United States government offi-
cial in which Margules praised Austria's advantages as a site
for depositing drug money. The arrest prompted the Austrian
Chancellor, the Finance Minister, and the president of the
Austrian national bank to defend Austria's strict bank secrecy
laws. In interviews conducted in March 1992, Chancellor
Vranitzky stated, "I do not see any reason at all to question
the principle of banking anonymity."334 He also said,
As far as the kind and the extent of the Austrian regulations
on anonymity, an agreement was concluded a long time ago
between the commercial banks and Austria's Nationalbank.
In addition, Austria's Foreign Minister has signed the Vienna
UN Drug Convention. Thus, Austria is one of the countries
that has undertaken to adopt efficient and useful measures
against money laundering.3 35
Although Austria has signed the Vienna UN Drug Conven-
tion, it has not ratified it. Ratification would mean that Aus-
tria would be compelled to render mutual legal assistance in
investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings in rela-
tion to criminal money-laundering offenses and would not be
able to decline assistance on the basis of bank secrecy. 36
The president of the Austrian national bank, Maria
333. Andrew Jack, Financial Reporting of Banks Criticized, FIN. TIMES, June
15, 1992, at 17.
334. Ernst Hauer & Margit Czoeppan, Vranitzky Comments on Banking Ano-
nymity, FBIS-WEUR, Mar. 11, 1992, at 8 (interview).
335. Gisela Hopfmfiller & Herbert Hutar, Vranitzky, Lacina Remark on Bank-
ing Anonymity, FBIS-WEUR, Mar. 9, 1992, at 9 (interview).
336. Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 7, § 5.
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Schaumayer, defended Austria's banking anonymity. She ar-
gued that there is no link between an offense committed by an
individual person and a country's saving system. Ms.
Schaumayer reiterated her position in a public statement: "I
am not willing to change the whole system because of the of-
fense by an individual person. There is no need to do that."33
Further defense of Austria's anonymous banking system came
from Austria's Finance Minister, Ferdinand Lacina. In accord
with a report by the Vindobona Bank, for which Mr. Margules
worked, Mr. Lacina stated that "the anonymity in the Austrian
banking system could be maintained even after Austria has
become a member of the EC."338
Austria's bank and tax secrecy laws are strictly adhered to
by the banking community, and Austrian authorities carefully
enforce the statutes (the exact penalties for noncompliance are
uncertain due to lack of information). Recent EC directives and
pressure on traditional financial centers have raised interna-
tional interest in Austria as a haven for laundering funds. At
present, Austria is believed to be attracting funds derived from
criminal activities at an increased rate, and indications are
that Austria's popularity among launderers will increase as
long as its laws guaranteeing secrecy remain in force.
Austria's membership in three important international
organizations and conventions currently provides the best
assurance of its compliance with international money-launder-
ing laws. In addition to having signed the Vienna UN Drug
Convention, Austria is a member of the OECD and the FATF,
which will eventually conduct an independent audit of
Austria's international money-laundering compliance program.
Austria is also a member of the Council of Europe and a signa-
tory to the European Laundering Convention. International
law enforcement officials hope these organizations will be suc-
cessful in persuading Austria to adopt tougher anti-money-
laundering laws.
The Financial Markets Adaptation Law will come into
effect on January 1, 1994.339 Among its provisions are that
337. Hopfmfiller & Hitar, supra note 335, at 9.
338. Lacina: Banking Anonymity to Remain, Even in EC, FBIS-WEUR, Mar.
27, 1992, at 12.
339. See Charles Pretzlik, European Business: Austria Gets in Line with EC
Banking Law, DAiLY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
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depositors will have to identify themselves when they open ac-
counts and will have to show proof of identity when depositing
more than 11,000 shillings into another person's account. In
addition, banks will be required to report suspicious clients to
the police. 4' This legislation follows statements made earlier
in the year by Justice Minister Nikolaus Michalek, initiator of
the investigations into the activities of those controlling the ac-
counts.34'
V. AN EVALUATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY-
LAUNDERING REGIME
Multilateral conventions, such as the Vienna UN Drug
Convention and the EC Money-laundering Convention, have
indisputably helped develop an international anti-money-laun-
dering regime. The conventions have focused the attention of
world leaders on the extent of the laundering problem and the
need to combat it. Agreements to override bank and business
confidentiality laws, to police banking and other financial net-
works through "know-your-customer" and "suspicious transac-
tions" requirements, and to enact laws to regulate profession-
als who operate offshore financial institutions in key jurisdic-
tions can be reached, but only when professionals and top
politicians decide that the benefits of an anti-money-laundering
regime outweigh the costs of enacting new laws and embarking
on new policies.
Multilateral operations, such as Operation Green Ice,342
that for sustained periods have used new enforcement methods
such as "controlled delivery"3 43 to penetrate the financial op-
brary, Intl File.
340. See i d.
341. Austrian Bank Anonymity Must Go, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar.
25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl File.
342. Operation Green Ice was a sting that occurred over a two-year period
involving six countries. It culminated in the arrest of more than 200 persons, the
seizure of nearly $42 million in illegal drug profits, and the penetration of major
drug organizations. For background, see Six Countries Strike Major Sting Against
Organized Crime Cocaine Ring, 8 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 399 (1992); Sharon
La Franiere, 150 Arrested in 6-Nation Drug Sting, Money Laundering Disrupted,
DEA Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1992, at A3.
343. "Controlled delivery" is a technique whereby national governments allow
the trafficking of drugs to occur in order to observe and gain intelligence on the
traffickers, so that law enforcement agencies may penetrate the organizations at a
higher level. Article 11 of the 1988 Vienna UN Drug Convention obligates signato-
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erations of kingpins in the Cali Cartel, indicate some of the
success of international anti-money-laundering enforcement.
For several years, authorities have also frozen Cali Cartel
assets in Luxembourg, the United States, and Panama simul-
taneously, although the cases are still in litigation in Luxem-
bourg.1
44
Yet another example of the success of anti-money-launder-
ing enforcement has been the enactment in Colombia of a new
money-laundering law based on the Organization of American
States (OAS) regulations. 45
The EC Money-laundering Directive has resulted in the
enactment of anti-money-laundering laws by EC members.346
The directive requires these laws to apply extraterritorially.
Banks and financial institutions that want to reach the major
markets of the EC and the United States, even if these institu-
tions are in jurisdictions without strong anti-money-laundering
laws, will be forced to comply with the laws of the United
States or the EC. For instance, in the author's own practice, he
became aware of a Latin American bank which has a mutual
fund in the Caribbean. Because this mutual fund uses a custo-
dian in Luxembourg, it must comply with the "know your cus-
tomer" requirement and other rules of the EC Money-Launder-
ing Directive, 47 however, the Latin American customers ex-
pect the usual guarantee of anonymity.
Another example of the penetration of the international
anti-money-laundering regime is that the regional FATFs do
not hesitate to criticize any country they believe are not com-
plying fully with anti-money-laundering principles, even princi-
ples that are not "hard law." For instance, this year the West
ry countries to engage in this technique, "if permitted by the basic principles of
their respective legal systems .... " Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40,
at art. 11.
344. For a discussion of the case, see Luxembourg Court Returns Drug Money
to Cartel, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 43 (1993) (discussing the victory by the
cartel in the court of appeals in Luxembourg). The case is now before the Su-
preme Court.
345. See supra part II.D.2.d.
346. See, e.g., Heidi Gramckow, Germany Enacts New Money Laundering Law,
8 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 432 (1992); Bruce Zagaris, Spain Adopts Money
Laundering Legislation, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 136 (1993); Bruce Zagaris,
Portugal Enacts Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
257 (1993).
347. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 113.
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European FATF has criticized Austria for not acting more
quickly to abolish laws that permit bearer shares and enable
financial institutions and their customers to avoid the "know
your customer" requirement.348
Communication between nations is key to developing the
anti-money-laundering regime. At present, organized crime
exploits communication gaps to conduct money laundering and
financial fraud in sophisticated ways that involve moving mon-
ey and balance sheets among countries. Because a national
regulator focuses only on the business that occurs during a
yearly or other time-cycle in its country, a bank such as BCCI
or an organized crime group masquerading as a financial insti-
tution or import-export business can move money or assets to
another country at certain times before an audit, so that the
regulator will not spot fraud or money laundering.349 Such
offenses can be discovered only when there is communication
between national governments.
Inter-governmental communication may occur when a
regulator is auditing a company and in the context of such an
audit requests assistance. Such communication may also occur
spontaneously when a national regulatory agency in the con-
duct of an audit, believes that the conduct of a business is
suspicious or may violate the law of another country.35 ° In
addition, bank regulatory agencies may conduct simultaneous
audits of problem banks and financial institutions that have
large business operations in tax-haven secrecy jurisdictions or
have their home offices in countries not known for strong fi-
nancial regulation; one such institution is BCCI, whose home
office is in Luxembourg.
Other substantive areas, such as international taxation,
provide for sophisticated, formal mechanisms for international
348. See West European Financial Action Task Force Calls for Austria to Tight-
en "Know Your Customer" Laws, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 295 (1993).
349. See, e.g., House of Commons Report on BCCI Urges Regulatory Reforms
While Liquidator Issues Accusations against 1986 Auditors, 8 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 84 (1992) (discussing a recommendation that "on a global level the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) should supervise the supervisors of banks like
BCCI that have multi-jurisdictional structures.").
350. For a discussion of closer cooperation and coordination with regulatory
authorities in supervisory multi-jurisdictional banks, see Bank of England Recom-
mends Legislative Changes to Avoid International Bank Frauds, 8 INT'L ENFORCE-
MENT L. REP. 255 (1992).
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enforcement cooperation. Tax authorities have mini exchange-
of-information agreements both multilateral35' and bilater-
al 352 as well as TIEAs within income tax treaties. 3 3 As a
result, tax authorities exchange information spontaneous-
ly,354 on request,355 regularly,35 ' and .in the conduct of si-
multaneous examinations. Also useful to national bank regula-
tory agencies would be the compilation of statistical informa-
tion that would be helpful in spotting potential general prob-
lems or special problem institutions. These and other types of
formal agreements can help regularize international enforce-
ment communication and other types of cooperation among
bank regulatory agencies.
Goodwill and understanding are important because trust
and patience are required to develop successful relations in
international anti-money-laundering enforcement. In the past,
states have allowed criminals and their counsel to exploit bank
secrecy laws by refusing cooperation with investigators. For
instance, in the celebrated Bank of Nova Scotia cases, persons
with accounts in the Cayman Islands branches of the Bank of
Nova Scotia tried to use bank secrecy laws to avoid compulsory
requests for information from a United States federal
court.357 Eventually, contempt orders and fines imposed by
351. See, e.g., Council of Europe-OECD Mutual Administrative Assistance Trea-
ty, in RUFUS V. RHOADES & MARSHALL J. LANGER, 5 INCOME TAXATION OF FOR-
EIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS § 85.00 (1993).
352. For background on bilateral exchange of tax information agreements, see
id. at § 81; see also Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2701
(Supp. 1993) (authorizing the United States to negotiate duty-free treatment of
eligible articles to beneficiary countries); I.R.C. § 274(h)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1993)
(providing for North American treatment for Americans attending conventions in
the countries that conclude TIEAs).
353. See Tax Implementation Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Virgin Islands, RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 351, § 82.01; see also Tax
Implementation Agreement Between the United States of America and American
Samoa, RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 351, § 82.02.
354. For a discussion of spontaneous exchanges of information, see RHOADES &
LANGER, supra note 351, at § 85.07.
355. RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 351, § 85.05.
356. Regular exchanges are also referred to as automatic exchanges. RHOADES
& LANGER, supra note 351, § 85.08.
357. In re Grand Jury Proceedings: United States v. The Bank of Nova Scotia,
691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (known as Bank
of Nova Scotia I); In re Grand Jury Proceedings: United States v. The Bank of
Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985)
(known as Bank of Nova Scotia II); In re Grand Jury Proceedings: United States
v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106
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the Eleventh Circuit courts overcame the bank secrecy laws,
but they also resulted in the development of bad-will between
the Canadian and Cayman governments and the United States
government. Eventually, the conclusion of MLATs for criminal
matters358 improved the goodwill.
The design of a proper international enforcement regime to
combat money laundering and financial fraud will require
cooperation among and input by experts in international orga-
nization theory, international law (especially international
criminal law, the law of international organizations, and eco-
nomic integration law), criminal justice, financial and banking
law, trade law, and economics. The North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) provides a good example of the need for
international cooperation. Currently, much money laundering
occurs on the southwest border in casas de cambio (exchange
houses) and in Mexican banks inland. Liberalization of the
movement of goods, capital, and people will enhance the ability
to move not only legitimate money, but also illegitimate mon-
ey. Without a central authority to compensate for the enhanced
opportunities to move illegitimate money, criminals will be
able to defraud more easily, using existing and new financial
vehicles to recycle the profits and proceeds of their crimes.
However, by recognizing problems such as these, governments
will be able to develop mechanisms and institutions to fill the
lucanae left by the gaps. For instance, as a precursor to and in
the wake of the discussions of NAFTA, the United States and
Mexico have concluded a TIEA 59 and proposed an income
tax treaty. 6 In areas such as intellectual property361 and
(1983) (also known as Bank of Nova Scotia III).
358. U.S.-U.K.-Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 159.
359. For an annotated text of the U.S.-Mexico TIEA, see Agreement Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the Exchange of
Information with Respect to Taxes, RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 351, § 81.11.
360. A proposed treaty between the United States and Mexico and a contem-
poraneous protocol were signed in September 1992. They require ratification by
both countries before taking effect and have been sent to the U.S. Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification. They are likely to take effect in 1993. For the
text of the proposed treaty and protocol, see RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 351,
§ 80.00.
361. For the intellectual property provisions of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), see Intellectual Property Provisions of North American Free
Trade Agreement, 6 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REv. 284 (1992) (NAFTA, pt. 6, ch. 17).
NAFTA provides for criminal sanctions and provisional injunctive relief for viola-
199,3]
952 BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XIX:3
environmental enforcement 62 the two governments have
likewise arranged for mechanisms to strengthen enforcement
cooperation. The EC, although initially without legal authority
to impose criminal legislation, has begun enacting anti-money-
laundering regulations 363 and has taken steps to form its
own police force 64 and to combat terrorism,365 organized
crime,366 illegal migration 67 and narcotics.368
Communication and goodwill between nations are the keys
to developing the anti-money-laundering regime. Such a re-
gime requires cooperation among and input by experts in inter-
national organization theory, international law (especially
international criminal- law, the law of international organiza-
tions, and economic integration law), criminal justice, financial
and banking law, trade law, and economics.
Assessments that go beyond the scope of this article of the
substance, procedure, and politics of the existing organizations
and conventions are also necessary for the proper development
of a regime. With a proper synchronization of international
approaches, the law enforcement community can achieve the
highest levels of enforcement consistent with respect for due
tions of its intellectual property protections. Id. at 290, 292 (NAFTA arts. 1715,
1717).
362. For a discussion of environmental enforcement between the United States
and Mexico in the context of NAFTA, see Bruce Zagaris, The Transformation of
Environmental Enforcement Cooperation between Mexico and the United States in
the Wake of NAFTA, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 61 (1992); Bruce Zagaris,
NAFTA Side Agreements Strengthen Enforcement, But Miss Opportunity to Provide
Meaningful Enforcement Cooperation Mechanisms, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
325 (1993). For background and a summary of the environmental side agreements,
see Agreement Reached on NAFTA Side Deals, Kantor Announces, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES, Aug. 16, 1993, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Allnws File, at *1.
363. See, e.g., EC Commission Imposes Wider Exchange of Confidential Super-
visory Information and Other Supervisory Requirements, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
REP. 339 (1993).
364. See European Community Moves Towards Establishment of European Police
Force (EUROPOL), 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 52 (1993).
365. Id.
366. See, e.g., European Cooperation Against Organized Crime Is Considered, 9
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 160 (1993).
367. For background on European action against illegal migration, see Europe-
an Ministers Agree on Enforcement and Criminal Action on Illegal Migration, 9
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 71 (1993).
368. For background on EC anti-narcotics action, see Berthold Baer, The Euro-
pean Community's Anti-Drug Efforts: An Analysis of the Legal Framework of EC
Anti-Drug Strategies After the Treaty of Maastricht, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
359 (1993).
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process, international human rights, and the need to minimize
disruption of normal international commerce.
VI. MECHANISMS TO COUNTER MONEY-LAUNDERING
DEVELOPMENTS
To combat existing and new forms of international money
laundering, multidisciplinary approaches are needed including
the use of international organization science theory, interna-
tional public law, and criminal law. Other mechanisms to com-
bat organized crime can also be used against money launder-
ers. These mechanisms should be long-term and uniform to be
most effective.
A. Long-Term
1. Establishment of a Regime for International Criminal Law
Some global interactions are initiated and sustained en-
tirely, or almost entirely, by nations. Other interactions, such
as narcotics transactions, laundering criminal proceeds, and
traffic in guns, involve private persons-money launderers and
especially organized criminal groups. If nations are to succeed
in the battle against organized crime, they must become more
sensitive to a world politics paradigm in which other organiza-
tions are accorded power. A successful effort will entail a more
innovative use of existing and new bilateral and multilateral
legal mechanisms, as well as more uniformity in national ac-
tions, so that law enforcement officials can be as mobile and
efficient as new organized criminal groups.
Remodeling world politics in this fashion would permit
national governments as well as IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs to
make more effective use of limited resources. In this way, long-
term alliances and elite networks among the various law en-
forcement organizations could be established and developed.
Interested members of the world community, especially
law enforcement officials, should study the interactions of the
above-mentioned organizations to determine the best ways to
design and implement a regime for international anti-money-
laundering law. To the knowledge of these authors, such a
study has yet to occur.
For instance, within the context of anti-money-laundering,
a country in the Caribbean or Andean region might consider
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its national enforcement policy and other alternatives to con-
struct an international subregime of international financial
enforcement cooperation. In the broader context of internation-
al criminal cooperation a national government might also com-
pare strictly national enforcement mechanisms to those nec-
essary to participate in an international criminal cooperation
regime.
Within the regime of international criminal cooperation,
many subregimes can and should be established to combat
organized crime. For instance, subregimes in the area of en-
forcement include, inter alia, transportation, customs, immi-
gration, and fiscal cooperation. Law enforcement officials and
all other persons concerned with organized crime, should be
included in the development of future subregimes. The task is
effectively to design new principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures which will combat organized crime without
detracting significantly from normal business operations, hu-
man rights, and constitutional protections.
2. Establishment of Subregimes
The international community's alarm about narcotics has
become so acute that it has agreed to surrender some sover-
eignty in order to achieve new forms of cooperation. It has
done this partly by agreeing to new types of cooperation, such
as extradition and mutual assistance. It has also agreed to
allow UN bodies, such as the Commission for Narcotic Drugs,
to monitor member countries' compliance with the Vienna UN
Drug Convention. 69 In the event that new types of crime be-
come significant, ° the international community will need to
develop other subregimes. These- subregimes should be moni-
tored regularly and evaluated in accordance with international
policies and international organization theory, so that the
subregimes can effectively counter new forms of organized
crime.
369. See Vienna UN Drug Convention, supra note 40, art. 21(a).
370. An example of this is stolen art, which is often the domain of organized
groups; INTERPOL has developed international modalities to combat art theft.
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3. Specific Mechanisms
Within the context of regimes and subregimes, the interna-
tional community can develop specific mechanisms to combat
new forms of organized crime.
One model to combat crime which has been suggested is
an International Criminal Court.37' The International Crimi-
nal Court would have its own charter. Initially, such a court
would be able to handle only specialized types of crimes, such
as illicit narcotics transactions and related money laundering.
In addition, it would be useful to create an International In-
dictment (or accusation) Chamber as an attachment to the
court to hear the prosecution's evidence ex parte and determine
whether evidence is sufficient to indict. A variation of an in-
ternational criminal court would be a permanent Regional
International Criminal Court. It would work, perhaps with the
International Criminal Court, in exercising appellate jurisdic-
tion over the decisions of the regional courts. Another potential
model is a modification of the current International Court of
Justice. That court's charter could be expanded to handle se-
lected cases of international criminal law, especially cases
dealing with certain organized criminal groups. This could be
done by creating a special chamber.
Another possible means of enforcement would be the es-
tablishment of a mechanism for complaints and reports. Inter-
ested or affected persons could lodge complaints to determine
whether states -are fulfilling their obligations in combatting
international organized crime. A periodic reporting system
could also be established whereby each UN member state must
report annually on the extent of implementation of UN agree-
ments, guidelines, standards, and other rules concerning cer-
tain international crimes of organized groups, such as traffick-
ing in arms and illicit narcotics. Interested persons and organi-
zations should have access to these reports which should be
widely disseminated. The world community should consider
conditioning the allocation of credits and eligibility for benefits
of IGOs, such as the World Bank Group and UN organizations,
371. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an
International Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNA'L L. 151, 158 (1992).
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on states' compliance with the above-mentioned UN agree-
ments concerning international crimes.
With the above introduction on general enforcement mo-
dalities for international criminal law, the remainder of the
article discusses more specific modalities directed at countering
money-laundering activity.
a. Create Universality of Jurisdiction for Organized Crime
and Subspecies of Crimes Therein
Due to the complexity of transnational criminality in the
modern world, the traditional concept of territorial jurisdiction
requires revision. Support should be given to international
criminal courts, so that prosecutions of money launderers will
not be impossible or ineffective due to territorial limitations.
b. Strengthen Enforcement Modalities
To ensure compliance with current enforcement modalities,
the following mechanisms, organizations, and committees are
proposed:
1. An international organization to supervise adoption of the
Vienna UN Convention should be established. This organiza-
tion would make suggestions and general recommendations
based on. the examination of information received from the
members and would bring questionable matters to the atten-
tion of the International Narcotics Control Board.
2. The UN interregional and regional institutes and con-
cerned IGOs and NGOs should give increased attention to
the issue of organized crime.
3. The UN Development Programme and other funding agen-
cies of the UN system, as well as member states, should be
urged to strengthen their support for regional, national, and
international programs for the prevention and control of
organized crime.
4. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
should integrate their loan programs to ensure that borrow-
ing countries have adequate anti-money-laundering proce-
dures in place.
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5. Simultaneous tax examinations of individuals and orga-
nized criminal groups involved in narco-terrorism should
occur.
6. Researchers and law enforcement officials should pay sys-
tematic attention to the property holdings of persons involved
in narco-terrorism, or to the property holdings of the groups
in which they participate.
Information among law enforcement agencies should be
shared whenever possible to further law enforcement opera-
tions. Internally, IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs should hold work-
shops and training programs on techniques to study organized
crime. States with MLATs should have a working group on
organized crime where their resources and the level of orga-
nized crime activity warrant such a working group." 2 The
commissions that implement bilateral MLATs can also include
working groups that, inter alia, exchange information on cases
and techniques of studying property holdings of organized
criminals. In view of the complexity and volume of the finan-
cial operations of organized crime, it is essential to take an
interdisciplinary approach that involves the combined exper-
tise of lawyers, police, accountants, financial analysts, comput-
er specialists, and investigators of corporate affairs.
B. Uniform Legislation
1. International Central Data Bank
An international central data bank should keep track of
and disseminate to interested governments the variety of laws
and regulations on various types of measures taken against
organized crime, such as sanctions against racketeering and
continuing criminal enterprises, illicit drug trafficking, money
laundering, theft of cultural property, use of mail and various
types of fraud.
372. Bruce Zagaris & David Simonetti, Judicial Assistance under U.S. Bilateral
Treaties, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, U.S. PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS 219, 228 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
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2. Dissemination
States and international actors should begin to design,
monitor, disseminate manuals about, and hold programs on
the importance of the following laws and procedures:
1. The right to financial privacy, currency transactions re-
porting, criminalization of money laundering, remedial mea-
sures, and blocking laws should be topics of discussion.
2. Legislation should be enacted that places on the person
holding the assets the onus of demonstrating that the assets
had been lawfully acquired. This is a revolution in legal prac-
tice and theory and, as such, should include the necessary
safeguards to protect the human rights of the suspect.
3. Information pertaining to the adoption of new laws and
methods on investigation and techniques to combat organized
crime and the establishment of special anti-corruption mea-
sures should be disseminated.
4. Physical protection, relocation, monetary support, and
identity-changing are increasingly important in the criminal
investigation and trial process and in enforcement efforts
against organized crime.
5. Special legislation aimed at narco-terrorist groups should
be passed in which the Government can impose draconian
penalties upon conviction of defendants and which provide
procedural advantages to the law enforcement officials and
prosecutors (i.e. ability to wire-tap and conduct undercover
operations). Examples of these are RICO and Continuing
Criminal Enterprises (CCE).
6. Legislation should provide rights and remedies to citizens
groups that are directly affected by organized crime. For
instance, in some civil law countries, victims have a right to
participate in the criminal proceedings and in decisions to
charge the defendant, and make their views known to the
court on evidence and appropriate sentences after conviction.
7. Uniform tax laws should be enacted around the world,
specifically targeting narco-terrorists. Organized criminals
earn a greater deal of money through their illicit activities.
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They do not report and pay taxes on this income. Hence,
many countries have found that laws are useful in successful-
ly tracing and prosecuting organized criminals.3
C. Financial and Technical Assistance
The following are ways in which financial and technical
assistance could be better utilized to combat money launder-
ing: 1) Nations and existing IGOs and INGOs should establish
technical assistance groups to provide technical services to
requesting states. 2) Assets seized and forfeited should be
shared with IGOs, INGOs, NGOs, and national governments
which participate in combatting the narco-terrorist crimes. 3) A
fund to provide technical assistance in narco-terrorism cases
should be established. This fund should be maintained by an
appropriate UN organ. 4) Technical assistance should be a part
of the agenda at regional conferences which bring together law
enforcement, prosecution, and judicial authorities. A network
to facilitate communication between meetings should be devel-
oped.
D. The Model Extradition Treaty Adopted at the 8th UN Crime
Congress and the UN Model MLAT Should be Widely Dis-
seminated
Most experts agree that the provisions of future model
international criminal cooperation treaties should complement
rather than replace existing cooperative arrangements. The
view of many experts is that the drafts could actually serve as
models for new national legislation, thereby contributing to the
harmonization and increasing uniformity of domestic legisla-
tion.
When concluding an MLAT, governments should apply as
many of the instruments of judicial assistance as posgible. As
the Australian government has noted, the establishment of
effective international mutual assistance arrangements re-
quires enormous political will. For a country to permit expo-
373. See generally Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Compa-
nies: Hearings on S. 98-151 Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 2
(1985).
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sure of its citizens to compulsory measures such as search and
seizure and the tracing, freezing, and confiscating of proceeds
of crime at the request of another country requires a political
decision. The political aspect of that decision cuts through
every aspect of mutual assistance, for domestic legislation
must be revised so that mutual assistance can be given and re-
ceived, appropriate bilateral and multilateral treaties and
arrangements can be established, and decisions about whether
to grant or to refuse a request in specific cases can be made.
Model extradition and mutual assistance treaties that the UN
Crime Prevention Committee is preparing should be helpful to
harmonize these efforts.
To ensure the efficient operation of international mutual
assistance against new forms of organized crime, states must
establish a Central Office. A Central Office is especially im-
,portant because the new forms of mutual assistance, such as
an anti-money-laundering subregime, require the use of coer-
cive investigatory or enforcement measures against citizens of
one country and their property at the request and for the bene-
fit of another country. This has a direct impact on the sover-
eignty of the requested country and produces divergent diplo-
matic, political policy, and operational interests in both coun-
tries.
E. Transfer of Proceedings, Transfer of Prisoners
Pursuant to the Vienna UN Drug Convention and other
international conventions, states should provide for the trans-
fer of prisoners and judicial proceedings at the criminal pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial stages.
F. Education and Promotional Programs to Raise the
Consciousness of the Public
Information should be widely disseminated to the general
public to inform it about money laundering. This can be done
very effectively through financial institutions. For example,
many financial institutions are now required to ascertain the
identity of new clients through proper documentation and
photographs.
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G. Assistance to Journalists and the Media
One of the best modalities to identify and expose narco-
terrorists is media exposure. It removes the anonymity from
narco-terrorist groups and the resulting comfort they enjoy.
The following efforts are suggested:
1. Stories by the media have resulted in concerted vio-
lence against the media, including the murder of jour-
nalists, and the burning and bombing of their businesses
and homes. Therefore, a fund should be established to
assist media/journalist victims of organized crime.
2. Better communication between local and international
media/journalists should be facilitated.
3. IGOs, NGOs, INGOs, and nations should educate the
public on the important role of the media/journalists in
combatting narco-terrorism, so that the general public
will support the media/journalists.
H. Support for Comparative Research and Data Collection
Comparative research and data collection related to issues
of transnational narco-terrorism, its causes, its links to domes-
tic instability and other forms of criminality, its prevention
and control should be supported so that better law enforcement
techniques can be developed.
L Links Between Different Organized Criminal Groups
Particular attention and action should be directed at the
links between different organized criminal groups, such as
drug and arms trafficking organizations, particularly with
regard to the acquisition of sophisticated weapons. 4 Nation-
al legislation for the effective control of weapons, ammunition,
and explosives and international regulations on the import,
export, and storage of such articles should be developed in
374. For a good discussion of an integrated and more active approach in com-
bating international organized crime, see ROY GODSON & WILLIAM OLSON, INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: EMERGING THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY (1993); See also
Report Warns of the New Threat of International Organized Crime to U.S. National
Security, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 299 (1993).
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order to prevent those weapons from being used by terrorist or
organized crime syndicates. International cooperation in secur-
ing evidence with respect to the prosecution or extradition of
terrorists is especially important.
J. Strengthening Controls of Movement Through Official
Points of Entry
By strengthening the security of airports and sea and land
border crossings, entry points will be less Vulnerable to move-
ment by international criminal organizations. Universal and
regional IGOs and bilateral programs should assist countries
in equipping the law enforcement authorities at points of entry
with mechanisms to detect contraband, such as drug sensing
mechanisms, sniffing dogs, drug identification kits, and other
means of detection. Legislatures should exchange information
on laws which apply penalties to transportation entities that
are aware of narco-terrorism and do not take prompt and ade-
quate steps to correct and report on it.
K Improving Cooperation with Economic Integration Groups
Economic integration groups should exchange law enforce-
ment intelligence and form special anti-narco-terrorism groups.
They should permit member law enforcement officials to oper-
ate within their borders,375 and, on request, they should pro-
vide mutual assistance. The more advanced economic integra-
tion groups,3 76 working with IGOs (e.g., UN) and INGOs (e.g.,
International Association of Chiefs of Police), should provide
technical assistance on request to other economic integration
groups.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Despite persistent efforts to develop an anti-money-laun-
dering regime, the power and resources of established and
newer organized criminal groups have continued to grow and
to infect financial systems worldwide. These groups are suc-
cessful in moving their money and wealth because they can
375. See Accord, supra note 124.
376. Examples are the Council of Europe, the European Committee on Crime
Problems, and the Trevi and Pompidou groups.
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readily access and exploit the newest forms of technology and
the best human resources. In the context of this new power
threat, the need to effectively allocate the international
community's limited resources to combat money laundering
becomes more urgent.
Given limitations on resources, it is critical to assess accu-
rately the degree to which various international actors crimi-
nally manipulate the movement of money. It is also necessary
to evaluate the various steps and mechanisms involved with
the transfer of funds, and to chart the potential scenarios for
funds transfers.
Once all scenarios are considered and frameworks and
institutions have been devised, international organizations and
governments can devote attention to strengthening old, and
devising new, techniques to combat money laundering. In the
short-term, the FATF, the Basle Committee, the UN, and
INTERPOL will remain the key universal international organi-
zations. Hence, their framework and external relations should
be strengthened to provide effective enforcement of anti-mon-
ey-laundering principles and legislation. The World Bank
group and regional banks could play a role in strengthening
the international financial regulatory frameworks, if such new
roles were conferred on them.
On a regional level,- the CFATF and regional counterparts
to the FATF will require support. In addition, regional organi-
zations such as CICAD are in dire need of increased support
and strength. Urgent attention and resources should be devot-
ed to devising and supporting enforcement mechanisms with
existing (i.e., the Caribbean Common Market and Community
and Organization of East Caribbean States) and proposed
regional integration groups.
The world is still in the initial phases of the establishment
and implementation of the anti-money-laundering regime.
Most of the world is just now issuing regulations or is only
beginning to evaluate the results of recently enacted anti-mon-
ey-laundering laws. An important aid to understanding and
evaluating the operation of these laws are the audits per-
formed by the FATF of each of its members. The results of
these audits are summarized in annual reports. Regional
FATFs will begin to undertake evaluation of their mem-
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bers, 7 thereby helping to inculcate the main principles of
the anti-money-laundering enforcement regime.
Even the United States, which has required "know your
customer" reports since 1979 and criminalized money laun-
dering in 1986, is undergoing a major reevaluation of its entire
money-laundering regime, so that it is more effective, less
burdensome and costly for businesses, and can broaden its
scope to embrace non-bank financial institutions and other
persons suspected of engaging in laundering. 378
Thorough assessments of the substance, procedure, and
politics of existing organizations and conventions are beyond
the scope of this Article, but are necessary for the proper devel-
opment of a regime. With a proper synchronization of interna-
tional approaches, the law enforcement community can achieve
the highest levels of enforcement consistent with respect for
due process and the need to minimize the disruption of normal
commerce.
The potential for law enforcement and national govern-
ments to obtain revenue from asset forfeiture has made such
officials more innovative and aggressive in bringing cases and
trying to obtain assistance from their foreign counterparts. The
success of these laws undoubtedly will continue to spark a rise
in international assistance requests and litigation in which
governments, defendants, and third-party counsel will partici-
pate.
The pervasiveness of the anti-money-laundering enforce-
ment regime, as reflected above in the example of the Latin
American bank with the mutual fund in the Caribbean and the
Luxembourg custodian that needs to establish "know your
customer" principles to meet EC requirements, has now made
business counsel aware of and responsible for following the
new principles. Similarly, international business counsel en-
gaged in asset protection and estate planning can no longer
advise so easily on anonymity and secrecy provisions. A few
377. See, e.g., Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Reaches Agreement to
Implement International Standards and Establish a Secretariat, 8 INT'L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP. 425 (1992).
378. See, e.g., Bank Advisory Group to Have Input Soon on Leaner Anti-Money
Laundering System, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 19, 1993, A-13 (explaining
that the U.S. Department of Treasury is forming a Bank Secrepy Act Advisory
Group to try to reduce burdensome reporting and other obligations established in
connection with the reporting obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act).
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years ago such counsel could more easily advise his or her
client to go to Switzerland or the Bahamas. The abolition of
formula B accounts in Switzerland and the conclusion by the
Bahamas of MLATs and guidelines make advice on anonymity
and secrecy more difficult. Business counsel also find them-
selves receiving phone calls from Swiss and Luxembourg coun-
sel, stating that the fiduciary accounts established years ago
must now be altered. Swiss and Luxembourg fiduciaries or
their counsel must either reveal the beneficiary owners or close
the accounts. Hence, the penetration of the anti-money-laun-
dering enforcement regime is so deep that evenbusiness coun-
sel are concerned with and must deal with it. As time passes,
the anti-money-laundering enforcement regime will experience
more harmonization of law and more of the details of the legal
components of the regime will be established.
Several additional mechanisms to combat money launder-
ing have been discussed in the preceding section. To effectively
implement these measures, the international enforcement
authorities in existence need the power and resources to match
those of organized criminal groups with their ability to exploit
new technology, liberalized trade, and existing gaps in the
international legal system.
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